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THE PECULIAR ROLE OF THE DELAWARE COURTS IN 
T H E COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS 
Jill E. Fisch· 
More large publicly-traded corporations are incorporated in 
Delaware than in any other state. 1 Since the early 1900s, Delaware has 
been the dominant choice as state of incorporation for the largest U.S. 
companies.2 Almost half the companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and nearly 60% of Fortune 500 companies have chosen to 
incorporate in Delaware. 3 This success in attracting corporate charters 
has been profitable; incorporations bring Delaware approximately $440 
million per year in franchise taxes and related fees. 4 
Scholars continually attempt to explain Delaware's success.5 
Reasoning that the choice of a state of incorporation involves the 
selection of a body of corporate law, they posit that the incorporation 
statistics reflect a preference for Delaware law. Although there is 
disagreement in the academic community as to whether this process 
leads to the selection of a value-maximizing body of corporate law or 
one that permits management self-dealing at the expense of shareholders 
or other corporate constituencies, scholars agree that the process is 
appropriately characterized as regulatory competition.6 States compete 
for corporate charters by offering variations in corporate law. Whether 
* Professor, Fordham Law School.© 2000Jill E. Fisch. Prepared for the UniversityofCincinnati 
School of Law 2000 Corporate Law Symposium on Contemporary Issues in the Law of Business 
Organizations. I am grateful to Susan Block-Lieb, Ehud Kamar, Neil Komesar, and Steve The! for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. I have also benefited greatly from discussions with justice Randy Holland. 
I. See, e.g., De me trios G. Kaouris, Is DelawartStill a Haven for lncorpuration?, 20 DEL.]. CORP. L. 965, 
1010 (1995) (stating that "Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation" for publicly traded 
companies). 
2. See ul. at 969-71 (explaining Delaware's rise to prominence in 1913 when New Jersey passed 
legislation effectively outlawing trusts and holding companies). 
3. See, e.g., Sara-Ellen Amster, Bureaucrats 1\1oveMoneyAraund Gwb~all.fromDelaware, WIL\1INGTON 
NEWS-]., March 24, 1998; Delaware Division of Corpurations 0ast modified Feb. I, 2000) 
<http:/ /www.state .de.us/corp/index.htm> (Web page of the Secretary of State stating that more than 
310,000 companies are incorporated in Delaware including 60% of Fortune 500 and 50% of New York 
Stock Exchange companies). 
4. See Sara-Ellen Amster, Others Try w ImilalL Delaware, WIL\Ili\'GTON NEWS·J,July 7, 1998. 
5. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a ProducL· Some Pieces oftk Incorporation Pu;;zu, I J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 225 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 17uory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Ehud Kamar, A Regulalmy Competilion 17uory of Inde!Lrminacy in 
CorjJoral£ Law, 98 COLU:\1. L. REV. 1908 (1998); William]. Carney, 17u Production ofCorporalL Law, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Enhance Finn Value) (Working Paper 1999). 
6. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1909 (describing consensus that corporate law has bred a system 
of regulatory competition and disagreement about whether the competition results in a race to the top or 
to the bottom). 
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the competition is described as a race to the bottom or a race to the top, 
Delaware emerges as the undisputed winner. 
Several factors, however, weaken the explanatory power of the 
regulatory competition model. First, variations in state corporation laws 
are minimal. 7 If there are few substantive differences between Delaware 
law and that of other states, it is difficult to understand the incorporation 
decision as reflecting a preference for Delaware law. Second, empirical 
analysis fails to demonstrate the superiority or inferiority ofDelaware's 
substantive law. For example, studies indicate that state antitakeover 
statutes reduce shareholder value.8 A race to the top theory would 
therefore predict that Delaware would not adopt an anti takeover statute; 
a race to the bottom theory would predict the adoption of a strong 
antitakeover statute. In fact, Delaware has opted for a middle ground 
and adopted a moderate antitakeover statute that is not adequately 
explained by either theory. Third, Delaware's advantage in attracting 
charters seems immune from competition. Despite efforts to enter the 
race, other states appear to be unable to compete.9 Indeed closer 
examination reveals regulatory competition to be essentially a two horse 
race. Corporations choose between incorporating in their home state 
and incorporating in Delaware. 10 Virtually no corporation chooses any 
other alternative. 
Importantly, choosing to incorporate in Delaware is not costless. 
Delaware's franchise fees for large corporations are significantly higher 
than those imposed by any other state. The largest corporations pay 
$150,000 a year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware. 11 
Although these fees may not be financially material for a Fortune 500 
company, Delaware's continued ability to impose fees substantially in 
excess of those charged by other states suggests that Delaware 
incorporation offers nontrivial value. 12 In other words, it suggests that 
the corporate preference for Delaware is real. 
As a result, scholars have continued their efforts to explain this 
preference by looking beyond substantive difierences in Delaware 
7. See, e.g., Carney, suj1ra note 5, at 729-34 (concluding that corpo rJ.te law is relatively uniform). 
8. See, e.g., William W . Bratton &Joseph A. McCahery, Regullllmy Competition, Regulatory Caj;lure, rmd 
CurjJuralde!fRegulalinn, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1881 n.65 (1995) (describing "[a] large body of empirical 
work [that) confirms that the antitakeovcr statutes had a harmful effect on shareholder value"). 
9. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalu7n a/1(1 CorporalL Lnw: Rifkctinns Upon Delaware, 83 YA!.ELJ. 663, 
665 (1974). 
10. See Daines, supra note 5. 
11. See Delaware Division of Corpuralinns Scludule of Franchise Tax, 0ast modified Feb. 26, 1999) 
<http:/ /www.state.de.us/ corp / sch-tax.htm> (describing the maximum annual franchi se tax asS 1 50,000). 
12 . See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market fo r Corporate Law 
(Working Paper, Sept. 22, 1999 draft). 
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corporate law. For example, commentators have developed transaction 
cost models of Delaware law, 13 arguing that Delaware reduces 
regulatory costs because of network externalities, 14 its commitment to 
regulatory responsiveness, 15 and the superiority of specialized chancery 
courts. 16 These alternatives provide explanations for Delaware's success 
that do not depend on proof that Delaware law is substantively superior. 
Many of the nonsubstantive explanations look to Delaware's body of 
case law as an important advantage. 17 The large volume of business 
litigation in Delaware, coupled with Delaware's specialized court 
system, results in a well developed collection of corporate law 
precedents. Commentators have argued that this collection may 
account both for Delaware's competitive success and the inability of 
other states to duplicate that success. 18 It is accepted legal lore that well 
developed precedent is particularly valuable to business decisionmaking. 
Legal rules that are easy to ascertain, with predictable consequences, 
reduce the cost ofbusiness transactions. 19 
A closer look at Delaware precedent reveals, however, that, although 
well developed, it is far from clear and predictable. 20 Recent work 
demonstrates a degree of indeterminacy in Delaware law that casts 
substantial doubt on the transaction cost model. 21 Because of this 
indeterminacy, it has been suggested that Delaware case law may 
impose excessive costs on Delaware corporations. 22 This finding 
13. But see Bernard S. Black, Is CorporaiL Law T mini': A Political and Economic Ana{ysis, 84 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 542, 585-89 (1990) (questioning R omano's transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success). 
14. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardi<,atinn and Innovation in CorporaiL Contracting 
(or "Tie Economics'![ Boilerpla!L"), 83 VA. L. RJ::V. 713, 763-64 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
CorpomiL Law, rmd Networks '![Contract, 81 VA. L. REV. 75 7 (1995). 
15. See, e.g., ROBERTA RO~l.t'-''10, THE GJ::KIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
16. See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and tlu Market for Corporate Chmters: History and Agenry, 15 DEL.]. 
CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (arguing that specialized judiciary makes Delaware incorporation more 
a ttrac tive); Black, supra note 13 at 589-90 (arguing that Delaware 's prominence is due to the expertise o f 
its judiciary). 
I 7. See, e.g., Stephen]. Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence and tlre Tieory '![Corporate Law, I 7 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 683,702 n.79 (1992) (describing scholars' reliance on Delaware case law as an explanation for 
iL~ compe titive success). 
18. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Tie StaU Comptiilion Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 
772 (1987). 
19. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Tie)udi.d.ary and Free }v/arkets, 21 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y II, 18 
( 1997) (desc ribing how system in which law is settled through well-develo ped precedent reduces transaction 
costs for business and increases socia l capital). 
20. See, e.g., Kamar, supra no te 5; Douglas M. Branson, lnde!Lrminary: Tie Final Ingrediml in an Interest 
Group Ana!ysis '![Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, (1990). 
21. See id. 
22. See Kamar, supra note 5, at 1919-22 (suggesting that the amount of indeterminacy in Delaware 
law may be suboptimal and impose excessive costs on business decisionmakers). 
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presents a puzzle to those who seek to explain the dominance of 
Delaware incorporation. 
This article offers a solution to the puzzle and an alternative 
explanation for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters-the 
unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts. The article focuses 
on the peculiar role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, 
a role that has received little attention from corporate law scholars. The 
article demonstrates that Delaware uses an unusual process to make 
corporate law. Delaware relies heavily on judge-made law, but the 
structure and operation of the Delaware courts causes Delaware's 
judicial lawmaking to differ from that in other states. Indeed, the 
process by which Delaware courts make corporate law resembles 
legislation in some ways. 23 
The article then evaluates this lawmaking structure from a standpoint 
of comparative institutional advantage. In particular, the article 
compares Delaware's process to the political process. The article 
concludes that Delaware lawmaking offers Delaware corporations a 
variety of benefits, including flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from 
undue political influence, and transparency. These benefits increase 
Delaware's ability to adjust its corporate law to changes in the business 
world. By identifying the role of the Delaware courts as central to 
Delaware's dominance of the market for corporate charters, this article 
has important implications for the application ofDelaware's success to 
continuing questions of regulatory design. 
I. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE CARY-WINTER DEBATE 
Analysis of regulatory competition in corporate law begins with the 
classic Cary-Winter debate. In 1974, William Cary published a seminal 
article identifying Delaware's leadership status as a corporate domicile.24 
Cary analyzed Delaware's success and concluded that, because of its 
substantial reliance on corporate franchise taxes, Delaware deliberately 
sought to attract corporate charters. Moreover, because the choice of 
state of incorporation is made by management, Cary posited that 
Delaware structured its corporation law to appeal to corporate 
management. According to Cary, the result was lax legal standards that 
favored management interests over those of shareholders. Cary termed 
23. Set, e.g.,Jill E. Fisch, RetroactiuiJy and ugal Cfumgt: An Equilibrium Approach, II 0 HARV. L. REv. 
I OSS, 1107 ·8 ( 1997) (developing description of traditional process of judicial lawmaking and contrasting 
that process with adjudication that closely resembles legislative lawmaking). 
24. See Cary, supra note 9. 
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the competition a "race to the bottom" and recommended federal 
minimum standards to stop the race. 25 
Cary's conclusions were challenged, most famously by Judge Ralph 
Winter.26 \Vhile agreeing with Cary's observation of regulatory 
competition in corporate law, vVinter argued that the competition was 
more accurately described as a "race to the top." Significantly, Winter 
argued that market constraints preclude managers from sacrificing 
shareholder interests by choosing a domicile with inferior rules of 
corporate law. Indeed, the markets within which firms operate create 
incentives for managers to choose the corporate law that maximizes firm 
value. 
Corporate law scholars have aligned themselves with Cary or vVinter 
and expanded on the analysis of regulatory competition. Lucian 
Bebchuk, for example, agrees ·with Cary that at least some aspects of 
regulatory competition are value-decreasing.27 Bebchuk warns t..~at state 
competition is unlikely to produce efficient rules governing "issues that 
are 'significantly redistributive';" issues that directly affect the strength 
of the market, particularly takeover regulation; and issues that implicate 
the interests of third parties. 28 Accordingly Bebchuk argues that Cary 
correctly concludes that state competition will, in some cases, cause 
states to provide legal rules that favor manager interests over those of 
shareholders. In his most recent work, Bebchuk, together with Allen 
Ferrell, argues that states have produced bad takeover law and suggests 
that takeover regulation is not an isolated example of the failure of 
regulatory competition but rather a reason to give greater credence to 
Cary's analysis. 29 William Bratton andj oseph McCahery offer a similar 
perspective, describing charter competition as an example of regulatory 
capture by corporate management and explaining that, as a result of this 
capture, state competition is unlikely to produce optimal corporate 
law.30 
Most corporate law scholars, however, align themselves with Winter. 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, concur in Winter's 
assessment that market factors are likely to result in corporate law 
25. !d. at 666, 696-705. 
26. See Ralph K. Winter,Jr., Stale LmJJ, Slumholder Protectwn, and the 77teory rifthe Corporation, 6]. LEGAL 
STUD. 251 ( 1977). 
27. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ftdt'Talism and the Corporation: 77te Desirable Limits on Sta!e Competition in 
Curporate u1w, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
28. See Lucian A rye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corpora!e Law: 77te Race to ProtectManagm 
.from Takeovers, 99 COLlJYI. L. REV. 1168, 1172-73 (1999) (describing Bebchuk's earlier analysis). 
29. See id. 
30. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 8, at 1862. 
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m aximizing firm value.31 Roberta Romano argues that an extensive 
body of empirical work demonstrates the success of regulatory 
competition in producing a body of corporate law that increases firm 
value. Indeed Romano goes so far as to defend the federalist structure 
that results in regulatory competition as "The Genius of American 
Corporate Law."32 Recent empirical work by Robert Daines lends 
further support to Winter's assessment by demonstrating that Delaware 
law increases firm value. 33 
The regulatory competition model has important implications for 
corporate law. Cary sought to predicate a defense of federal 
incorporation or, at least, federal minimum standards, on his description 
of regulatory competition as producing a race to the bottom. 34 Romano, 
in contrast, uses her defense of state competition to argue against federal 
regulation oftakeovers. 35 In fact, Romano asserts that the demonstrated 
success of regulatory competition in corporate law supports adoption of 
a similar approach to securities regulation in place of the existing system 
of mandatory national rules.36 
It is difficult, however, to explain Delaware's dominance in the 
market for corporate charters on the basis of the substantive superiority 
ofDelaware corporate law, whether substantive superiority is defined as 
better for shareholders as in vVinter's view, or better for managers, as 
Cary claimed. For one thing, state corporation statutes contain 
relatively little substantive variation. Careful empirical research reveals 
that corporate codes tend toward uniformity.37 Even though 
innovations may initially cause statutory differences, the statutes rapidly 
converge. 38 Although convergence is a predictable result of regulatory 
31. See, e.g., fRA.:'\1\. H. EASTERBROOK & DA;'.lEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONO:O.IIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATEL\W 1-40 (1991 ). 
32. Romano, supra note 15. 
33. See Dai nes, sujmz note 5 (concluding that firms which incorporate in Delaware have statistically 
higher Tobins Qs). 
34. See Cary, supra note 9, at 70 l. 
35. See Romano, supra note 15, a t 75-84. 
36. See Robe rta Romano, Empowering lnvestars: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 
2359 (1998); sec a lso Stephen]. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciproci.Jy: Rethinking the International 
Reru·h of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 ( 1998) (arguing that issue rs should be able to choose 
"'hich jurisd iction's disclosure requirements apply to it). 
37. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as Hi.rwry: The Prospecl.r j01' Global Convagence qfCMjJorau 
Govmwnce and It.r Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 702 (1999) (" the best documented finding in the 
empirical literature on the U.S. corpora te charte ring competition is that a high degree of uniformity has 
emerged in American co rporate laws"); Carney, supra note 5, at 717 (empirical study concluding that 
American corpo rate law is "relatively uniform across most sta tes"); Romano, supra note 18, at 709 (finding 
"substantial unifo rmity across the states"). 
38. See Carney, supra noteS, at 729-34. 
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competition, Delaware's ability to dominate the market in light of this 
convergence is less explicable. 39 
In addition, evidence suggests that, although Delaware is successful 
in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. Cary and Bebchuk have 
noted a variety of ways in which Delaware law appears to favor 
management interests at the expense of shareholder interests.40 
Bebchuk's more recent analysis of takeover regulation indicates that 
Delaware's substantive law of takeovers is particularly problematic, an 
analysis that is not contradicted by Romano's efforts to defend Delaware 
law. 41 Romano and other scholars in the Winter camp agree that state 
antitakeover regulation inefficiently interferes with the market for 
corporate control, yet these scholars are unable to reconcile this 
inefficiency with their defense of regulatory competition.42 If states 
compete for charters by offering superior products, it is difficult to 
understand why competition has not addressed the observed problems 
in Delaware law. 
Indeed, if there is a competitive market for corporate charters, why 
has no state been able to supplant Delaware by offering a superior 
statute? To the contrary, no state has been able to duplicate Delaware's 
success at attracting charters. Although other states have attempted to 
compete by modeling their law after that ofDelaware, they are unable 
to attract incorporations.43 Cary and other commentators point to the 
relatively recent effort by Nevada to become a "Delaware of the 
West."44 In addition to adopting the Delaware statute, the Nevada 
legislature adopted Delaware case law.45 Moreover, courts construing 
Nevada law appear to follow Delaware precedent.46 Nonetheless, 
39. Bernard Black maintains that substantive corporate law is not merely uniform , it is trivial. See 
Black, supra note 13. 
40. See Bebchuk, supra note 27; Cary, supra note 9. 
4 1. See Bcbchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1184-91 . 
42. See id. at 1197. Bebchuk and Ferrell note that Romano 's defense of Delaware's anti takeover 
regulation consists of arguing I) "that Delaware ha.' been slow to adopt antitakeover legislation"; 2) that 
Delaware's statute is "not as draconian" as those of some other states; and 3) tha t "federal takeover 
regulation is likely to be worse." !d. 
43. Se.e Carney, supra note 5, at 718 (describing unsuccessful attempts by Nevada and Maine to 
compete with Delaware). 
44. See Cary, supra note 9, at 665; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 488; see generally Keith Paul 
Bishop, Tlu Delaware oftlu WesL- Does Nevada Qffer Better Trwlmenlfor Direclms', 7 No.3 INSIGHTS 20 (1993) 
(describi ng Nevada's efforts to compete with Delaware in attracting corporate charters). 
45. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 488 (explaining that Nevada ado pted both Delaware 
statutory and common law applying to corporations); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 
1342, 1346-47 (D. Nev. 1997) (rejecting ITT's argument to the contrary and explicitly fmding that Nevada 
follows Delaware case law). Ser. also Kamar, supra note 5, at 1911 (describing Nevada's adoption of 
Delaware law as "wholesale"). 
46. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1347 (following Delaware law on the power relationship 
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Nevada has not persuaded corporations to consider Nevada 
incorporation as a viable alternative to the traditional choice between 
their home state and Delaware. 47 
These observations have led to a refinement of the academic models 
of regulatory competition. Commentators have replaced the initial 
attempts to defend Delaware's dominance on the basis of substantive 
superiority by a broader range of explanations. Roberta Romano, for 
example, has done extensive work explaining why Delaware, from a 
transaction cost perspective, has an incentive to compete for corporate 
charters and is able to maintain its existing advantage in the race. 48 
Romano explains that, because Delaware is a small state and is heavily 
dependent on the revenues it obtains from corporate franchise taxes, it 
is able to commit to its regulatory structure in a way that is impossible 
for states that lack similar financial incentives.49 This vievvpoint is 
shared by] onathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, who further explain the 
selection ofDelaware as driven by interest group dynamics. 5° Under the 
11acey & Miller model, Delaware competes by making its law attractive 
to the lawyers who benefit from litigation conducted in Delaware. 51 
This competition need not increase firm value; indeed it may lead to a 
litigation intensive regulatory structure that sacrifices the interests of the 
firm and its shareholders in favor of the interests of counsel. 
Scholars have expanded on the transaction cost approach and 
identified a variety of nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's 
success. Although a complete analysis of these explanations is beyond 
the scope of this article, they include the responsiveness of the Delaware 
legislature and its commitment to updating the Delaware statute,52 
Delaware's specialized and expert judiciary which provides both rapid 
and high quality litigation decisions, 53 network externalities provided by 
Delaware law,5+ and herd behavior. 55 
between corporate board and shareholders); Shoen v. Alv!ERCO, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (D. Nev. 1994) 
(followin g Delaware precedent with respec t to judicial review of directors' interference with shareholder 
voting power). 
4 7. Su Ka mar, supra no te 5, at 1911. 
4-8. See R omano, supra note 5; Romano, supra note 15. 
49. See Romano, supra note 15 , at 37-42. 
50. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5. 
51. See id. at 4 70 (explaining that "the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts 
to maximize revenues to th e bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington la"ye rs who 
pract ice corporate law in the sta te"). 
52. See, e.g., Kaouris, supra note 1, at 973 (desc ribing responsiveness of Delaware legislature to 
corporate needs) . 
53. See infra notes 112-121. 
54. See supra note 14. 
55. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 37, at 703 (explaining that "[c]orporations may prefer to locate in a 
popular jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the inherent 
2000] ROLE OF THE DELA ~VARE COURTS 1069 
Whatever the source of Delaware's advantage, firms pay for the 
privilege ofDelaware incorporation. The largest firms pay $150,000 a 
year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware.56 Although this 
amount may seem small relative to the operations of a large public 
corporation, it is five hundred to one thousand times the amount those 
firms would pay to incorporate elsewhere. 57 Troubled by the evidence 
that Delaware can persistently charge what appears to be a 
noncompetitive price for the privilege ofincorporation, scholars persist 
in an effort to explain how Delaware incorporation adds value. In terms 
of transaction costs, the choice of Delaware can be explained if 
Delaware incorporation reduces the costs ofbusiness operations. The 
benefits of Delaware incorporation may include such nonsubstantive 
advantages as better courts or more readily available case law. So long 
as the benefits outweigh the slightly higher cost of Delaware 
incorporation, firms will continue to choose Delaware. 
The problem with many of the nonsubstantive explanations for 
Delaware's success is the inability of scholars to tie Delaware's supposed 
advantages to predictable cost savings for Delaware firms. For example, 
although a competent and expert judiciary might reduce the cost of 
litigation, 58 Delaware law seems to create an increased risk oflitigation 
for Delaware firms. 59 The combination of reduced litigation costs but 
increased incidence oflitigation is likely to have an indeterminate effect 
on firm value. 60 Scholars also attribute Delaware's success to network 
externalities, which reduce information and compliance costs. 61 Yet 
there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that Delaware firms incur 
superiority of its law"); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, PathDeperuknce in COTpom.U Contracting: Increasing 
Returns, Herd Befuwiar and Cognitive Binses, 74 WASH. U. L.Q 347, 353 (1996) (considering the role of herd 
behavior by corporate lawyc~). 
56. See J1.1pra note 1 1. 
57. See Kahan & Kamar, rupm note 12 (describing franchise tax structures in other states); see alro 
Cyril Moscow, iviichigan or Del.m.ctue Incorporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1897, 1902 n.18 ( 1996) (quoting proxy 
statement of Devon Energy Corp. which claimed that the major factor behind decision to reincorpo rate 
in Oklahoma was elimination of the annual Sl50,000 franchise tax associated with Delaware 
incorporation). 
58. A.n expert judiciary might, of course, produce better litigation outcomes as well. To the extent 
that bencr outcomes arc the result of less judicial error, they can be included in the cost of litigation. To 
the extent they result from superior judgc.madc law, the better outcomes arc another aspect of the structure 
of Delaware lawmaking analyzed in Pan II, infra. 
59. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 12, at 50 (arguing that Delaware law increases the level of 
litiga tion for Delaware firms); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bllllkruptq Judges and Bllllkruptcy Vmue: Some Tlwughts on 
Delaware, I DEL. L. REV. I, 23 (1998) (describing Delaware corporate law as litigation intensive). 
60. But see Carney, rupra note 5, at 727 (arguing that Delaware law makes litigation more costly for 
businesses than litigation elsewhere, to the benefit of Delaware lawyers). 
61. See rupra note 14. 
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lower legal costs. 52 Indeed, the limited scholarship on this issue suggests 
that interest groups such as Delaware corporate lawyers have market 
power of their own and are able to extract additional fees from firms 
that incorporate in the state. 63 In addition, the increased legal costs 
associated with out-of-state incorporation have been cited as a downside 
to Delaware incorporation. 64 Moreover, a reduction in attorneys' fees, 
like the more general reduction in legal costs, would have to be weighed 
against the greater risk of litigation associated with Delaware 
incorporation. 
Delaware's body of decisional law provides a more general 
transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success. Commentators 
argue that, because of the substantial volume ofbusiness litigation in the 
state, Delaware has built up a store of precedent that serves as an 
independent and valuable resource for firms subject to Delaware law. 65 
Thus Romano explains that Delaware's "well-developed case law with 
a pool of handy precedent" makes Delaware decisions "more 
predictable than those of other states."66 Mel Eisenberg describes 
Delaware's rich case law as increasing predictability. 57 
Extensive and predictable case law reduces the cost of business 
operations in two ways. A well developed body of precedent makes it 
cheaper and easier to ascertain the legal consequences associated with 
business decisions, thereby reducing the information cost of structuring 
transactions. In addition, clear legal rules reduce the risk of subsequent 
litigation. Notably, these benefits are independent of the substantive 
merits of the applicable legal rules. Commentators have observed that, 
with respect to business transactions, it is often more important that the 
applicable legal rules be settled than that they be settled correctly. 58 As 
62. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, ugal lmplicalions ofNetwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL. 
L. REV. 479, 5 77 (1998) (questioning extent to which network extcrnalitie5 can be expected to reduce the 
cost of legal services) . 
63. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 5 , at 472; Kamar & Kahan, supra note 12, at 54. 
64. See, e.g., Charles W . Murdock, ~Wzy Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and Delaware Corporate 
JurisjJrurknce, 19 S. Iu. U. LJ. 1, 4-6 (1994) (describing the extra costs for an Illinois business to incorporate 
in Delaware). 
65. See, e.g., Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporalion Law qf 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
861, 894 (1969) (offering as the reason for Delaware 's dominance: "the large body of precedent tha t has 
been built up since 1899-lawycrs know what they arc getting into"). 
66. Romano, supra note 5, at 277. 
67. See Melvin Aron Eise nberg, The Structure tfCorporatinn Law, 89 COLliM. L. REV. 1461 , 1508 
(1989). 
68. See, e.g. , Evan H. Caminkcr, 11'7zy lv!u.st lnfmor Courts Obry Supmor Court Precedents~, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 817,872 (1994), Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 5 71, 598 (1987) (citing predictability 
as more important than optimality in contract and real estate transactions); Avery Katz, The Strakgic 
Structure of Offer and AccejJI.ance: Game Thory and the Law of Contract Flrnnalwn, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 218 
(1990) (common approach to the rules of offer and acceptance in contract law is that "it is more important 
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a consequence, the predictability and stability provided by Delaware's 
extensive body of precedent are described as one of the affirmative 
advantages ofDelaware incorporation. 69 
Upon closer examination, however, Delaware law is revealed not as 
predictable, but rather as surprisingly indeterminate. A number of 
factors contribute to this indeterminacy. D elaware's corporate law rules 
are standards based, Delaware precedents are narrow and fact-specific, 
and Delaware courts employ weak principles of stare decisis leading to 
extensive doctrinal flux. It is difficult to reconcile this reality of 
Delaware law with the received economic wisdom that stable and 
predictable legal rules are optimal. 70 As a result, Ehud Kamar and 
.lviarcel Kahan raise questions about the efficiency of Delaware law, 
suggesting that the indeterminacy of Delaware law may be value-
reducing. 71 Moreover, Kamar argues that Delaware effectively employs 
indeterminacy to impede the ability of other states to compete with 
Delaware for corporate charters. 72 Thus indeterminacy increases 
Delaware's market power. These conclusions create a puzzle for Kamar 
and Kahan. IfDelaware law is suboptimal, is Delaware's market power 
merely the result of anticompetitive behavior? Is Delaware a successful 
monopolist that has taken advantage of imperfections in the market for 
corporate law? 
This article suggests another answer. In the following section, the 
article explores in greater detail the manner in which Delaware 
produces corporate law. The article demonstrates that Delaware 
employs an atypical lawmaking process . A substantial portion of 
Delaware's corporate law is made by the courts, but the Delaware courts 
make law in a manner traditionally associated with legislative rather 
than judicial lawmaking. The following section of the article explores 
the normative implications of this process. 
for the law to be se ttled than to be settled correctly"); sec also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 
393, 406 (1932) (adhering to precedent "is usuall y the wise policy, because in most matters it is mo re 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right"'). 
69 . See, e.g., Kaouris, supra note I , at 1011; Massey, supra note 17, at 702-3 (sta ting that "there is 
widespread agreement that one important reason [that more large corpor~Hions inco r·porate in Delaware 
than any o ther state] is that Delaware otTers a more certain and predictable body of law"). 
70. See, e.g. ,John C. Coates, IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rul.t '![Corporal~ Law: lvfinori!JI .Discounts in 
Conjlicl Transaclwns , 147 U . PA. L. REV. 1251 , 1256 (1999) (" Ideal rules of corporate law should be 
consistent."). 
71. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 12, at 67 (concluding that "it is likely that Delaware law is more 
litigation-in tensive than is optimal"). 
72. See Kamar, supra note 5. Kamar does not argue that Delaware's use of indeterminacy is 
purposeful. 
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II. THE DELAWARE COURTS AS LAWMAKERS 
A. The Traditional Lawmal.,'ing Role rf the Courts 
In other projects, I have analyzed the lawmaking role of the courts 
and some of the structural differences between judicial and legislative 
lawmaking. 73 I have developed what might be described as a model of 
traditional judicial lawmaking. I argue that traditional judicial 
lawmaking is generally evolutionary in nature. 74 More specifically, 
judicial lawmaking is characterized by incremental legal change within 
the framework of a fixed set of objectives.75 Unlike legislatures, courts 
rarely change legal rules as a result of a shift in political power or a 
rejection of the policies that motivated the adoption of the original rule, 
preferring to leave those decisions for the legislative process. 
Courts are also limited in the scope of the legal change that they can 
effect due to limitations on control of their agendas. 76 Courts, unlike 
legislatures, generally cannot initiate legal change but must wait for 
litigants to commence an action. 77 Courts may also, in some 
circumstances, be constrained by requirements such as justiciability as 
to the issues that they can reach. 78 As a consequence of these 
limitations, adjudicative legal change is more predictable, coherent and, 
frequently, smaller in magnitude than legislative change. 
These characteristics are enhanced by the doctrine of stare decisis 
which operates to limit the circumstances under which a court may 
deviate from a previously adopted legal rule. In another pending 
project, I explain how stare decisis enhances the stability of judicial 
lawmaking. 79 While a legislature requires no justification to overturn a 
previously adopted statute or reject a policy objective embraced by its 
predecessor, a court's disagreement with the wisdom of a previously 
adopted legal rule is rarely sufficient to justify overruling. Instead, a 
court that wishes to overturn a precedent must generally demonstrate 
that the prior legal rule suffers from some sort of substantive or 
73. Set Fisch, supra note 23; Jill E. Fisch, A Theory '![Stare Du:isis (working paper, 2000) (on fil e with 
author). 
74. Su Fisch, supra note 23, at II 07-8. 
75. Said. 
76. Ste general!;; Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Coruirtmcy: On Equality, lnugrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 
I 05 YALE LJ. 203 1, 2081-83 ( 1996) (describing dilferences in relative power of courts and legis latu res as 
lawmakers). 
77. Su NEIL K. KO~IESAR, !~!PERFECT ALTERNATIVES 125 (1994). 
78. Set, e.g., RlCHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART MTI WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 123-293 (4th ed. 1996) (exploring various justiciability doctrines such as standing, 
ripeness, and so forth, that limit the lawmaking power of the federal courts). 
79. Su Fisch, supra note 73. 
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procedural defect. 80 .AJthough a court may seek to escape the 
consequences of a contrary precedent by distinguishing it, that very act 
narrows the scope of the court's decision. This distinction between the 
legislative and judicial processes permits the government to choose 
greater legal stability by committing particular subject matter to the 
courts. Thus the doctrine of stare decisis fosters stable legal rules and 
privileges courts over legislators as creators ofthose rules. 81 
Finally, the temporal scope of judicial lawmaking reinforces the 
traditional judicial role. Judge-made rule changes typically apply 
retroactively. 82 This operation can be justified on both fairness and 
efficiency grounds because of the nature of judicial lawmaking. 83 A 
variety of doctrinal constraints limit the ability of courts to apply new 
legal rules in a purely prospective manner. In the federal courts, for 
example, prospective adjudication may run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause or the constitutional ban on advisory opinions. 84 
Forward-looking aspects of judicial opinions may also be characterized 
as dicta, a characterization that allows subsequent courts to disregard 
such statements as authoritative rulemaking. 85 These constraints 
effectively limit the extent to which judicial rulemaking can focus on the 
regulation of future transactions. 
These characteristics of traditional judicial lawmaking increase the 
stability and predictability of judge-made law relative to legislation. I 
argue elsewhere that these features may explain the dominance of 
common law rules in areas such as property and contract law, where 
stability and predictability are said to reduce transaction costs and 
facilitate transactions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified the 
primacy of stability and predictability in these areas as a basis for 
applying principles that restrain judicial lawmaking to this traditional 
mode, such as requiring courts to adhere closely to precedent. 85 
80. See Ui. 
8l. See Ui. 
82. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298,311-12 (1994) ('"The principle that 
statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familia r to evc1y law 
student."') (q uoting United States v. Sec . Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)). 
83. See Fisch, supra note 23, at I 1 I 0. 
84. See, e.g. , id. at 1061 (discussing Supreme Court decisions o n adjudicative prospectivity); james 
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (199 1) (rejecting selective adjudicative prospectivity on 
the grounds that it was imperm issible to apply difTerentlegal rules to similarly situated litigants). 
85. See, e.g. , Michael C. Dorf, DU:ta !Uld Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994) 
(distinguishing between holdings and dicta and tracing concern over the legitimacy of federal court dicta 
to the case o r controversy requirement of Article III). 
86. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 50 1 U.S. 808,828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare deci.ri.s 
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract right~, where reliance interests are involved . .. "). 
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B. Characteristics of Delaware law 
Although Delaware's role in the competition for corporate charters 
is frequently analyzed in terms ofDelaware's corporation statute,judge-
made law is at least as, if not more, significant. Despite their statutory 
source, the majority ofDelaware's important legal rules are the result of 
judicial decisions. The scope of the business judgment rule, the analysis 
of transactions that implicate the duty of loyalty, the legal standards 
governing management's response to a hostile tender offer, all are based 
on legal principles articulated by the Delaware courts. Lawyers tend to 
think of corporate law as statutory, but there is a substantial common 
law component to Delaware corporate law. 
From a transactional perspective, the importance of decisional law 
increases. Although the Delaware statute provides general guidelines 
about corporate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings87 
and the required components of a corporate charter, 88 the statute does 
not deal with the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of 
corporate law and allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial 
scrutiny of corporate decisionmaking. As a practical matter, the 
interpretation and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart 
of corporate law, yet the Delaware statute provides almost no guidance 
on the subject. Apart from the provision that relates to interested 
director transactions,89 the Delaware statute does not even address the 
subject of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a 
greater extent than other states. Other state statutes, for example, define 
the standard of care applicable to corporate directors;90 the Delaware 
statute does not. 91 Although Delaware decisions authorize directors to 
87. See DEL. CODE.\J'-li'i. tit. 8, § 2 11 (1991) (requirements regarding annual shareholder meeting). 
Indeed, even with respect to these types of issues, literal compliance with the statutory requirement.s may 
not save a transaction from judicial sc rutiny. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 43 7, 439 
(Del. 1971 ) (the court rejected advancement of the date of an annual meeting, in compliance with the 
relevant statute, ho lding that "inequitable action docs not become permissible simply beca use it is legally 
possible ."). 
88. See DEL. CODE A."\N. tit. 8, § 102 (1991) (specifying required contents o f certificate of 
incorporation). 
89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § !44 (1991). 
90. See E. Norman Veasey &Julie M.S. Seitz, 77u BUSJness ]udgmr:111 Rule in th.e Revised M otkl Act, th.e 
Trans Union Case, and tJze A.lJ Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TE..'( . L. REV. 1483, 1493 (1985) (stating that a 
number of states have codified the duty of care); see, e.g., VA. COD I:: ANN. § 13.1-690A. (Michie 1985) 
(defin ing director's duty o f care in terms o f "his good faith business judgment of the best interest of the 
corporation"); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1984) (add ressing standards of conduct for Directors); 
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (adopting statutory standard of care). 
91. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 44, at 2l (explaining that Nevada has codified the standard of care 
applicable to directors, but Delaware has not). 
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consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, 92 Delaware has 
no "other constituency" statute. 93 Other states have codified the 
business judgment rule;94 Delaware has left development of the rule to 
common law. 95 Georgia has a statutory provision addressed to the 
corporate opportunity doctrine;96 Delaware relies on precedent. 97 Even 
the circumstances under which a demand is excused in a shareholder 
derivative suit are addressed in Delaware by judge-made chancery court 
rules rather than by statute .98 
The lawmaking by Delaware courts is also distinctive. As noted 
above, Delaware decisional law is relatively indeterminate.99 Delaware's 
judicial lawmaking also has a number of atypical characteristics that 
cause it to resemble the legislative process. Despite the similarities, 
Delaware courts do not face the political pressures associated with 
legislative lawmaking; indeed, for state courts, the Delaware courts 
enjoy a high degree of political independence. 
Recent scholarship has highlighted the indeterminacy of Delaware 
law. 100 As Ehud Kamar shows, Delaware cases have adopted a largely 
92. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
93. Su Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical FramruJorkfor Enforr:ing Corpora!L Constitumry 
Statutes, 70 TE..'i:. L. REV. 579 (1992) (describing other constituency statutes and states that have adopted 
such statutes); John A. MacKerron, Variery of Choice in the Corporate Law "Menus" of the Great Laks Slatts, 71 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 469,486-87 (1994) (describing othe r co nstituency statutes in laws of Great Lakes 
states and obse!>'ing that Delaware has no such provision). 
94. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1 (1984) (adopting standards of liability for 
directors); Julie Gwyn Hudson, The Exclusivity '![the Appraisal Rmzer!J Under theN= Norllz Carolina Business 
Corpomtion AcL· Deciding the Standard if ReviruJfor Cash-Out Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 501, 537 n.248 (199 1) 
(exp laining that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (1990) codifies the business judgment rule). 
95. See Veasey & Seitz, sujJTa note 90, at 1505 (stating that Delaware docs not have a statute on the 
business judgment rule). 
96. See GA. CODEA'\N. § 14-2-87\ (a)( ! )(C) (1994) (autho rizing an action against corporate officers 
or directors for the appropriation of any business opportunity of the corporation). 
97. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (deve loping Delaware common law corporate 
opportunity doctrine). 
98. Set DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (addressing demand requiremen t); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I 0, § 361 
(1999) (authorizing chancellor to adopt rules of chancery court). Compare N.Y. Bt.:s. CORP. LAw§ 626(c) 
(McKinney 1999) (statutorily specifying when demand is required); Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 198 
(N.Y. 1996) (concluding that changing the scope of demand requirement was properly a subject for the 
legislature not the court). 
99. Some commentators go further and characterize substantive areas of Delaware law as 
incoherent. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 70, at 1287 (describing "current Delaware rules on minority 
discounts [as] incoherent, unpredictable, and inconsistent with the appraisal statute") . 
l 00. The discussion here focuses on the indeterminacy o f Delaware's liability rules. The nature of 
corporate law creates highly indeterminate remedial law as wtll. For example , difTiculties in valuation make 
it difficult to predict the result of a judicial de termination to award fair price or fair value. See general[y 
Ruthcford B. Campbcll,Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N. CAR. L. REV. 101, 105 
(1999) (describi ng absence of underlying principles in valuation determinations and resulting lack of 
consistency and predictability in case outcomes). This ambiguity is both inherent in business law and not 
unique to Delaware. 
1076 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
standard-based approach. 101 Kamar focuses on cases dealing with 
fiduciary duties and demonstrates that fact-intensive legal standards 
dominate the case law. Legal tests that turn on the proportionality of 
management's response to a perceived threat, that assess the legitimacy 
of a self-dealing transaction based on whether it meets a test of "entire 
fairness," and that use reasonableness as a benchmark for evaluating 
business decisionmaking are standard based. Standards apply general 
principles that judges must use to evaluate transactions from an ex post 
perspective . Louis Kaplow explains that standards, in comparison to 
rules, increase judicial discretion. 102 This discretion, in turn, reduces the 
ability of decisionmakers to predict the legal consequences of their 
actions ex ante. 
Delaware courts also apply the relevant legal standards in a fact and 
case specific manner. As a result, one court's determination that a 
particular course of dealing was reasonable under the relevant legal test 
provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent decisions 
applying the same legal test. One of the best known illustrations of this 
problem is the takeover cases. Some commentators 103 have struggled to 
formulate a theory ofDelaware takeover doctrine that permits them to 
reconcile cases such as Paramount Communications, Inc. u. Time, Inc. 104 and 
Paramount Commuications, Inc. u. QVC Network, Inc .. 105 Such a reconciliation 
is extremely difficult, however, and leaves the courts open to the charge 
that their decisions are random or arbitrary. 106 Although the outcomes 
in these decisions can be explained instead on the basis of factual 
differences, this analysis can only be performed on an ex post basis. 107 
As a result, the decisions offer little insight to those who seek predictive 
power from doctrinal analysis. 
Kamar's observations about Delaware law admittedly are true, to 
some extent, about corporate law in other states. Indeed, many states 
choose to follow Delaware decisionallaw. 108 Nonetheless, to the extent 
I 0 I. See K.ama r, supra note 5. 
I 02. See Louis Kaplow, Rules VerS11S Standards: An Economic Ana[ysis, 42 D UKE LJ. 55 7 (1992). 
I 03. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Parrulox: TJu Delaware Supreme Court 's Takover ]uri.rprudence, 
19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994) (a rguing that Delaware's takeO\'er jurisprudence is based on the scope of 
authority allocated to directo rs). 
I 04. S 7l A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
105. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
I 06. See, e.g., David A. Skeei,Jr. TJu Unanimity Norm inDelmvnre Corpom.l.e Law, 83 VA. L. REv. 127, 166 
(1997) ("From a doctrinal perspective, Trme-Warner [571 A.2d at 1140J and QVC arc extremely difficult to 
reconcile."). 
107 . See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1918 (explaining tha t the "key" to reconciling Time and QVC 
is "a close reading of factual nuances"). 
I 08. See, e.g., Alva, supra note 16, at 903 n.92 (describing frequency with which prominent Delaware 
decisions have been cited by other courts). 
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that legal standards diverge, the principles adopted by Delaware courts 
retain the greatest degree of ambiguity. For example, under Delaware 
law, a court faced with a motion by a special litigation committee to 
dismiss a derivative suit may, in addition to considering the degree to 
which the committee was informed and independent, also evaluate 
whether, in the court's independent business judgment, dismissal is 
appropriate. 109 The New York courts have rejected the second 
component of this test, significantly reducing the degree of judicial 
discretion. 110 Similarly, Delaware's controversial intermediate standard 
of review in the takeover context is not universally accepted as the 
appropriate test for evaluating the directors' conduct. 1 11 
Delaware decisional law is also characterized by a high degree of 
flexibility and responsiveness. Not only are Delaware courts active 
lawmakers, they are willing to revise previously announced legal 
doctrines on the theory that a different approach reflects sounder policy. 
In part, the flexibility ofDelaware case law results from the structure of 
the Delaware courts. The Delaware chancery courts, which are the trial 
level courts on corporate issues, are courts of equity. 112 Delaware 
adheres closely to traditional English principles of equity 113 and is one 
of only three states to retain the equity /law distinction. 1 14 The nature 
of equity jurisprudence contributes to the flexibility in Delaware 
corporate law 1 15 and, because chancery courts sit without a jury, they 
are able to resolve corporate issues rapidly. 116 Delaware courts are also 
known for their ability to respond to business litigation quickly through, 
for example, granting expedited hearings and providing a rapid 
d . d . . 117 turnaroun tlme on ec1s1ons. 
The Delaware chancery courts are also specialized courts. 118 
Approximately three quarters of the cases pending before the chancery 
l 09. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981 ). 
II 0. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) 
Ill . See, e.g. , OHIO REV. COD I:: ANN. § I 70 1.59(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (rejection of Unocal and 
codification of existing common law). 
112. See Alva, supra note 16, at 903. 
113. Sa William T. Quillen & Michael H anrahan, A Slum Histmy ufth.e IX/awure Cuurt ofChuncery-
1792·1992, 18 DEL.j. CORP. L. 819, 840 (1993) (explaining that "the Court of Cha ncery of the State of 
Delaware, has adhered more closely to the English Court of Chancery and to English precedents, than 
those of any of her sister States") (footnote omitted). 
114. See Alva, supra no te 16, at 903. 
115 . See, e.,~., Kamar, supm no te 5, at 1943 (describing how Delawa re courts remain faithful ro 
trad ition a., co urts of equity); Massey, supra note 17, at 703 (describing how equity jurisdiction contributes 
to ncxibility and responsiveness of Delaware decisional law). 
11 6. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (providing that the Chancel)' court sits without a jury); Massey, 
JUpm note 17, a t 704 (explaining tha t absence of a jury enables the court to act more quickly). 
ll7. See Massey, rupra note 17, at 704. 
118. Seeid.at705. 
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court are corporate. 119 Delaware chancery judges are known for their 
expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation 
for its sophistication in corporate law. 120 As a result, chancery court 
opinions are widely quoted, and the legal standards announced by the 
chancery courts are widely taken to reflect the current state ofDelaware 
law.l21 
The fact that a specialized trial court is, in Delaware, the primary 
judicial lawmaker, increases the degree of flexibility in Delaware 
corporate law. The decision of one chancery court does not bind 
another, and chancery court decisions are readily overturned by the 
Delaware Supreme Court even when they appear to have developed 
workable or predictable legal standards. Thus, as a practical matter, 
Delaware case law is based on a large number of decisions that have 
little stare decisis effect. 
Although decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court are, of course, 
binding on the chancery court, the supreme court also appears ready to 
distinguish or overrule a precedent without regard to considerations of 
stare decisis. The absence of attention to stare decisis is partially a 
consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court's decisions; the 
court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case 
specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. 122 Similarly the court can 
narrow the precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings 
narrowly and tying those holdings to specific facts. Yet even when the 
court overrules itself, it does so seemingly unconstrained by the 
considerations of stare decisis that commonly limit overruling. For 
example, when the court explicitly overturned several of its own 
precedents in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 123 the opinion made no reference 
to the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead, the court operates on the basis 
that it, like a legislature, can rewrite its prior doctrine based solely on a 
reassessment of the relevant policy considerations. 
The unanimity norm of the Delaware Supreme Court further 
distinguishes the Delaware judiciary from that of other state courts. 
David Skeel explains that the norm also contributes to the instability of 
Delaware legal doctrine. As Skeel has observed, the Delaware Supreme 
119. See Alva, supra not<: 16, at 903 . 
120. Delaware courts also enj oy a greater degree of political ind::pendencc than that o f many state 
courts. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text. 
121. See, e.g. , William H. Rehnquist, Th Promimrzce ojtk Deu1ware Cuurt ojCiumcery in. tk Stau-Fedeml 
Join£ Venlure of Prwiding]uslice, 48 Bus. Ltw. 351 (1992). 
122. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Conslraimd by Preceden!, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1989) (desc ribing 
the argument that a court which distinguishes a precedent by narrowing the previously announced rule to 
the facts of the prior case is, in effect, unconstrained by the precedent). 
123. 45 7 A.2d 70 I (Del 1983). 
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Court has an unusual tendency to issue unanimous decisions. 124 Skeel 
explains that the unanimity norm destabilizes Delaware law by masking 
the degree to which varying judicial preferences may lead to cycling 
from one doctrinal approach to another. Skeel demonstrates how the 
varying preferences of individual justices as to the appropriate legal 
approach in takeover cases may explain the doctrinal shift from Time-
Warner to QVC. 125 In addition to departing from the decisionmaking 
process used by other states, the Delaware Supreme Court's 
decision making process, in which a single result masks conflicting or 
cycling lawmaking principles that are likely to animate future results, 
more closely resembles legislative decisionmaking. 
Delaware judges also control their lawmaking agenda to an unusual 
degree. 126 Chris Peters explains that, as a general principle, judges 
cannot generally choose the legal issues that they wish to decide, but 
rather must wait for the appropriate case to present itself. 127 Legal rules 
announced by a court that are unnecessary to the result in a given case 
are disparagingly characterized as dicta. 128 Similarly, courts are 
constrained as to the temporal scope of their lawmaking. Recent 
Supreme Court precedent finds constitutional support for the principle 
that judicial lawmaking should be retroactive, and that it is improper for 
a court to announce a legal rule in a case and then fail to apply that 
legal rule to the parties before it. 129 
Delaware courts seem unconstrained by these principles. They have 
repeatedly announced legal principles solely to guide future business 
decisionmaking. 130 Ron Gilson explains Chancellor Allen's practice of 
providing doctrinal guidance for future transactions through dicta. 131 
Despite upholding the structure of a transaction or the decision of the 
board, Allen went out of his way on a number of occasions to point out 
124. See Skeel, supra note I 06. Skeel points to a number of factors that contribute to the unanimity 
norm, including an unusual Supreme Court rule that provides for an automatic en bane hearing in any case 
in which a justice dissents from a panel decision. 
125. See i.d. at 166 
126. Indeed, Delaware recently amended its Constitution to permit the Delaware Supreme Court 
to answer questions certified to it by other State Supreme Courts. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) 
(granting Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine questions oflaw certified to it by the highest appellate 
court of any other state). Most states only accept certified questions from federal court.>. See Geri J. 
Yonovcr, A Kinder, Genlla Ene: Rdning In tlzt Use ofCertifoation, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305, 314 (1994) (describing 
state certifiGl.tion rules as of 1988). 
127. See Peters, supra note 76, at 2048. 
128. See generally Dorf, supra note 85 (describing legal significance of characterizing reasoning as dicta). 
129. See Fisch, supra note 23, at l 060-63 (analyzing decisions requiring retroactive adjudication). 
130. Doug Branson terms these announcements "roadmaps." See Branson, supra note 20, at 104-05. 
13!. See Ronald]. Gilson, The Fine Art of]udgi.ng: Wzlliam T. Allm, 22 DEL.j. CORP. L. 914, 917-18 
(1997). 
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weaknesses or deficiencies that should be remedied. 132 A notable 
example is the Caremark decision 133 in which Chancellor Allen provided 
a comprehensive description of the duties of corporate directors 134 in the 
context of approving a settlement and despite concluding, at the outset 
of the opinion, that "there is a very low probability ... that the directors 
ofCaremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise 
the enterprise." 135 The fact that the description was dicta did not seem 
to affect its importance as an addition to Delaware law. The principles 
announced in Caremark have been among the most frequently cited by 
subsequent courts and commentators. 136 
Delaware courts have also reached out to apply newly announced 
doctrines to cases seemingly outside the courts' reach . For example, 
concerned that stockholders would not anticipate its new rules 
governing appraisal rights and take the necessary steps to preserve their 
rights, the court in Weinberger announced that it would permit 
stockholders in a variety of ongoing transactions and lawsuits to 
retroactively claim the benefits of the new rule. 137 This decision was in 
clear contravention of the statutory limitations on the assertion of 
appraisal rights. The supreme court's action in vVeinberger was a 
departure from the lawmaking norm that judges lack the freedom to 
adjust the timing with which their newly announced legal rules take 
effect in order to reflect policy considerations. 138 
In conclusion, Delaware courts are not structured like typical state 
courts and do not restrict themselves to traditional judicial lawmaking. 
Instead, Delaware courts aggressively adopt and modify corporate law 
doctrine, exhibiting a degree of activism that more closely resembles the 
legislative process. This resemblance is enhanced by the nature of 
l32. Gilson cites this practice with approval. 
Such self-conscious a tlention to influencing the conduct o ffuturc transact ions, indepe ndent 
of the case before the court, gives special meaning to the phrase "mere dicta." In the fast 
moving environment into which events thrust the Court of Chancery, traditional common 
law accretion of precedent was too slow to help. The Chancellor's instrumcmal use of dic ta , 
directed exp licitly at transac tion planners, was a creati,·e and elegant response to the 
problem of keeping the law moving at a pace at least close to that of the market. 
Id. Z~t91 7 -1 8 . 
133. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriva ti ve Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
13 4. See id. at 966-70. 
135. Irl at 961. 
!36. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Govenumce: 77ze B(lard of Directors and Internal Control, 19 
Ci\RDOZO L. REV. 23 7, 261 (1997) (desc ribing Chancellor Allen's statements in Caremark as the "most 
comprehensive and authoritative statement on the current status of (the board's mo nitoring obligation]"). 
!37. See Weinberger v. UPO, Inc. , 457 A.2d 701, 714-15 (appl yin g its remedy to pending and 
proposed mergers in which prospective plaintiffs might have already lost the right to pursue an appraisal). 
138. See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1119 (discussing Weinberger approach as a way of providing courts with 
greater temporal flexibility). 
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D elaware decisional law, which, although largely indeterminate and 
standard based, appears to be driven by policy considerations, including 
an effort to respond on an ongoing basis to developments in the business 
world. In short, Delaware judicial lawmaking may seem more closely 
ti ed to legislation. Nonetheless, as the next section will explain, the 
Delaware courts should not be seen as part of the political process. 
Indeed, D elaware judges enjoy a number of compara tive advantages 
over state legislators as corporate lawmakers. 
III. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DEL\WA.R.E 'S LA.\v'?vfAIZING 
PROCESS 
Thus far, this article has characterized Delaware judicial lawmaking 
as unusual. Does this unusual lawmaking matter? In particular, of what 
relevance is Delaware's lawmaking process to the debate over regulatory 
competition? In this sec tion, this article evaluates the normative 
consequences ofDelaware's lawmaking. The article considers whether 
D elaware's approach to corporate lawmaking is likely to increase firm 
value, thereby offering an efficiency-based explanation for D elaware 's 
ability to attract corporations. Alternatively, Delaware's lawmaking 
structure may, as suggested by Kamar, simply be a mechanism by which 
Delaware can maintain its position and increase its market power. 
This article concludes that Delaware's unusual lawmaking structure 
enhances firm value and perhaps explains the widespread preference for 
Delaware incorporation. Delaware's lawmaking process is valuable in 
three ways. First, Delaware's indeterminate corporate law may have 
benefits as well as costs . Indeterminacy induces negotiation and 
removes some incentives for strategic behavior. Indeterminate law also 
gives the courts greater flexibility. Second, D elaware's lawmaking is 
uniquely structured to maximize responsiveness to changing business 
developments. Finally by vesting a high degree oflegislative lawmaking 
power in a decisionmaker that is largely insulated from political 
pressure, Delaware reduces the potential for rent-seeking in connection 
with the lawmaking process. 
A. 17ze Valu e qf Indete7minacy 
Traditional analysis favors clear legal rules both because cl ear rules 
reduce information and litigation costs and because clear rules are 
viewed as more likely to induce primary behavior in compliance with 
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those rules. 139 A legal system that relies on standards and muddy rules 140 
increases uncertainty which, in turn, increases transaction costs. 
Accordingly, traditional analysis suggests that business is more efficiently 
conducted under a clear rule based system. 
Obviously this argument is overstated. A standard based approach 
can provide more realistic treatment of particularized facts. In cases in 
which factual distinctions are important, a rule based approach is likely 
to be unworkable. 141 A broadly written rule will prove overinclusive and 
discourage valuable transactions; a narrowly written rule will be 
underinclusive and easy to avoid through careful planning. For 
example, if one takes the view that management resistance to a hostile 
tender offer is sometimes desirable , it would be legislatively difficult to 
specify the circumstances under which such resistance is permissible. A 
muddy "reasonableness" standard reduces the difficulty of specification 
while preventing opportunism. 
Standards thus increase lawmaking efficiency in two ways. Standards 
permit the lawmaker to tailor the result in a case and to thereby avoid 
the hardship or unfairness associated with application of a crystalline 
rule without destroying the applicable doctrinal structure. 142 Standards 
also create an affirmative role for the courts as gapfillers. 143 In the 
business context, the absence of a explicit prohibition may imply that a 
transaction is unrestricted although, as a practical matter, it may be 
impossible to predict and specifY the full range oflimitations on business 
decisionmaking. Private business contracts are similarly likely to contain 
gaps due to changing or unanticipated circumstances or the practical 
impossibility of complete specification. Standards allow the courts to fill 
139. See, e.g., K.amar, supra note 5, at 1919 (describing importance oflegal determinacy to business 
decisionmaking); see general!J'Jason Sconjohnston , Unarllzin!J, ChaiJS, and tJu T IJT"ls Process: An EconomicAna{ysis 
uf Legal Form , 76 COR:'\E.U. L. RE.V. 34 1 (1991) (discuss ing indeterminacy and the rela tive impact or rules 
versus standards on primary behavior). 
140. The characte riza tion or indeterminate legal rules as "muddy" originated with Carol Rose. See 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and lvfud in Proper!J Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 5 77 (1988). R ose describes muddy rules 
as "fuzzy, ambiguous rules o f decision ." !d. at 578. Muddy rules and standards arc closely related concepts, 
although, as Dan Burk explains, commentato rs gener..tlly choose their terminology based on the focus or 
their analysis. See Dan L. Burk, Mudr{y Ruus for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 129 ( 1999). Rules 
a re described as muddy by commentators who are focu sing on the indeterminacy of the rules. 
Commentators emphasize a standards based approach when they arc focusing on the fl exibility that 
standards provide to decisionmakers. See id. For purposes o f this article , the choice of termino logy is 
unimportant, Delaware decis ional law can accurately be described as both standard based and muddy. 
141. Indeed, even perfect rules are both under and ovcrinclusivc. See johnsto n, supra note 139, at 
363. 
142. See Rose, supra note 140, at 603-04. 
143. See Ian Ayres, kfaking a Difference: The Conlr~utual Contributions ufE!1.Jterhrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1391 , 1404 ( 1992) (explaining how ex post gapfilling by courts can be more efficient than ex ante 
specification of rules). 
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these gaps through ex post determinations. As Ian Ayres has observed, 
courts and the common law process are particularly well suited to this 
role. 144 
Muddy rules may have particular utility in the business context 
because of their effect on the bargaining process. Ian Ayres and Eric 
Talley characterize muddy rules as an example of divided entitlements, 
in which each party has a probabilistic claim. 145 They then use game 
theory to demonstrate that muddy rules may facilitate bargaining. First, 
in the absence of the ability to predict a winner if the dispute results in 
litigation, the parties may be more willing to negotiate. Second, muddy 
rules can reduce the incentives to engage in strategic behavior by forcing 
parties to reveal information during negotiations. 146 
Rules that encourage negotiation instead of litigation are especially 
valuable in corporate transactions, in which litigation costs can be large 
and create a deadweight loss for shareholders and society. Although 
D elaware law is often described as encouraging litigation, 147 a careful 
examination reveals that many Delaware cases settle early in the 
litigation process and that Delaware law both encourages and facilitates 
settlement. 148 Indeed, it is possible to explain some of the muddiness of 
Delaware case law as resulting from the procedural posture of the 
relevant judicial proceedings. Cases in which a court is considering a 
request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more indeterminate than 
cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal 
record. 149 Similarly, Delaware's pro-settlement orientation may cause 
courts to announce legal rules in the context of approving a settlement. 
The Caremark 150 decision is an example of this practice. Another 
example is Kahn v. Sullivan, 151 in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
announced the legal principles that determine when corporate 
144. See Ui. at 1394 ("Common law co urt' arc the onlr institution tha t could possibly fill gaps better 
than the firms themselves."). 
145. Su Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomvnic Bargaining DivUiing a ugal Entitlement to FacilitaJe Corman 
Trrzde, I 04 YALE LJ. I 027 (1995). 
146. See also Jason Scottjohnston, Bargaining Under Rule.r Ver.ru.r Standarrls, II J.L. Eco~. & ORG. 256 
(1995) (demonstrating thatcontingent ex post entitlements may induce efficient bargaining bette r than clear 
ex ante entitlements). 
14 7. See sujlm notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
I +8. See, e.g., Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlmtenl Fever, BUS. LAw TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, 
at 7 (describing 2'/, year study o f settlement practices in Delaware Chancery court and finding that court 
approved 96 of98 proffe red settlements and awarded an ave rage of92% of the attorneys fees requested). 
149. See Gilson , Jujlra no te 131 , at 9 15 (describing how fast-paced takeover market caused much 
takeover litigation to be resolved after a chancery court decision on a motion for a prelimin ary injunction 
and prior to appe llate review or trial on the merits). 
!50. See In re Caremark lnl'l , Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch . 1996). 
lSI. 594 A. 2d 48 (Del. 1991) 
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philanthropy amounts to waste. 152 Although in reviewing a settlement, 
the court must consider the strength of the plaintiffs claims, the Kahn 
court warned that its role was extremely limited. 153 This limited role 
may result in rules that differ from those that would be announced in a 
different procedural context. 
:Muddy rules also enable courts to engage in ex post tailoring of the 
legal structure to the particular factual context presented. The nature 
of the litigation process provides courts with information that gives them 
a comparative advantage over legislatures \Vith respect to this type of 
tailoring. Although legislatures may be better suited than courts at 
gathering information ex ante, they are less likely to see the ex post 
consequences of their chosen rules. Corporate law, in particular, 
because of the essentially unlimited range of structural possibilities, may 
make ex ante specification difficult. Corporate lawmakers may be 
unable to determine the appropriate legal standards until they see a 
range of factual scenarios. 154 Muddy rules provide courts with the 
flexibility to respond to these scenerios. 
The foregoing analysis does not mean that indeterminate corporate 
law is an unqualified good, merely that indeterminacy has benefits as 
well as the costs that have been identified by Kamar and others. 155 
vVhether these benefits exceed the costs of indeterminacy to Delaware 
firms is an empirical question. 
T he costs ofindeterminacy may, however, be overstated. 156 Although 
indeterminacy increases the risk of liability, the penalties for corporate 
decisionmakers who guess wrong are particularly limited. To the extent 
that legal rules arc; indeterminate, corporate officers and directors are 
able to engage in a broader range of conduct without acting in bad faith. 
So long as they act in good faith, corporate decisionmakers are unlikely 
to face personal liability for their decisions. Indeed, good faith is 
typically the key to insuring their protection under statutory and charter 
limitations on personal liabiliti 57 and corporate indemnification 
!52. See jill E . Fisc h, Teaching Corpo rate Governance Through Sha reholde r Litigation, 34 Ga. L. 
Rev. H3 (2000) (di scuss ing Kahn's holding and its significance). 
153 . Sec594A.2dat 59. 
154. See Ed\,·ard B. R ock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorjJOral.e Law !York.' , 44 UCL<\. L. REV. 
I 009, I I 02 (199 7) (explaining that "the D elaware legi slature and coum cannot promulgate ex ante the 
standJ.rds to gO\·ern new situations until they sec a variety o f cases and figure out how well o r badly peo ple 
behaved"). 
155. See, e.g., Kamar, supra no te 5. 
156. Ehud K ama r, fo r example, a rgues that indete rminacy subjec ts corpo rate decision makers to the 
ri sk o f cos tl y sanctions such as liability for money damages. See Ehud K a mar, Sharelwlder Litigation Under 
lndeterminal.e Corporale Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 , 892-96 ( 1999). 
15 7. See, e.g., CarlS. Bjerre, Note, Evaluatuzg the New Director Etculpati.on Statulu, 73 CORl'iELL L. REv. 
786 (1988) (desc ribing protection of co rporate decision makers und er exculpation statutes). 
2000] ROLE OF THE DELAWARE COURTS 1085 
provisions .15B As a result, decisionmakers may not face a substantial risk 
of personal monetary liability under indeterminate legal rules. 159 To the 
extent that a court's ex post application of a muddy rule results in 
injunctive relief, the injunction may simply have the effect of instructing 
the corporation as to the legal limits on its conduct. Thus, for example, 
if directors adopt a poison pill of questionable validity, the court's 
decision to strike it down is more informational than punitive, and the 
directors are unlikely to be worse off as a result of the decision than if 
they had decided not to adopt the pill in the first place. 
B. The Value qf Responsiveness 
At the recent Business Associations session of the Annual "tvieeting of 
The Association of American Law Schools, Ron Gilson observed that 
corporate law matters when the real world changes. 100 The evolution 
of Delaware case law reflects the truth of this observation. Delaware's 
law of fiduciary duties in the takeover context was the product of the 
frenzied takeover market of the late 1970s and early 1980s, including 
the extensive use ofjunk bond financing, public concern about the effect 
of corporate mergers on labor and community members, and the 
development by corporate management of a range of antitakeover 
devices. As the independent board of directors grew in importance, and 
shareholders began to rely on the independent board to monitor 
management decisionmaking, the Delaware courts responded by 
developing the scope of the duty of care and the circumstances under 
which the business judgment rule would protect board decisions. 
Recent controversies between large shareholders and management over 
the potential conflict bet\-veen shareholder voting power and 
management authority over corporate decisionmakingpresent questions 
such as the legality of the dead hand poison pill and the permissibility 
of shareholder rights bylaw amendments. 16 1 
Delaware's lawmaking process is ideally suited to respond to 
developments in the business world. First, Delaware is able to respond 
quickly. Although courts can, by nature, respond more rapidly than 
legislatures to a new development-the filing of a lawsuit is all that is 
158. See, e.g., DEL. CODE A,'\TN. ti t. 8 , § 145 ( 1999) (permittin g ind emnificatio n so lo ng as o f1ic c r or 
d irector ac ted in good fa ith); if Waltuch v. Co nticommodity Se rvs., Inc., 88 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(interpreting Delawa re indemnificatio n sta tute to require good faith ). 
159. Cf Kama r, supra no te 156, a t 895-96 (arguing that ri sk o f liability co nstra ins be havi o r of 
co rpora te fiduciari es) . 
160 . See Commen!S at the AALS Sectio n on Business Associations, Washington , D .C. (Jan. 6, 2000). 
161. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Siocklwlder-Adopted By,-Laws: Taking Back Ute 
Slreee, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998) (evaluating shareholder righ!S bylaws under De laware la w). 
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required to trigger the lawmaking process-the traditional common law 
process is slow. 162 The unique features ofDelawarejudiciallawmaking, 
including the activism of the courts and the limited role of stare decisis, 
allow Delaware to overcome this problem. Rather than considering 
themselves constrained by an evolutionary lawmaking process, 16:1 
Delaware courts respond with the type of broad and aggressive 
lawmaking more commonly seen in legislatures and administrative 
agencies. 164 Procedural features of the Delaware courts enhance their 
responsiveness, including the courts' historic receptiveness to requests for 
expedited proceedings 165 and their willingness to issue rulings quickly in 
the context of a fast-paced business transaction. 166 The specialized 
caseload and the overall small size ofDelaware's dockets further add to 
the judiciary's ability to respond quickly. 167 
Second, Delaware is able to respond in a preliminary fashion to initial 
developments , which enables it both to signal the potential legal 
response to the business community and to await the development of 
further information in response to that signal. The procedural context 
of many chancery court decisions, in which the court is ruling on a 
request for expedited relief, allows the court to provide tentative 
guidance about a fast-paced business development while awaiting a full 
factual record before committing itself. Similarly, the courts can use 
their standards based fiduciary principles to defer the development of 
bright line rules. 
Delaware's analysis of dead hand poison pills illustrates this process. 
The first legal guidance on the subject was issued by the chancery court 
in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, lnc.168 The court narrowly held, in the context 
of a motion to dismiss, that dead hand pills were subject to challenge 
162. See, e.g., Issac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Ana[ysis of Legal Rulmwking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 279 (197+) (describing common law process as too slow to keep up with the need for lega l 
change resulting from growth in economic activity). 
163. See Fisch, supra note 23 , at 1118 (explaining that "adjudicative lawmaking is typically 
evolutionary"). 
164. Su Erlich & Posner, supra note 162 at 279-80 (describing legislatures and administrative agencies 
as able to change the law more quickly, in part because they are not bo und by principles of stare decisi s) . 
165. See Kurt M. Heyman, Etpeditcd Proceedings in the Delaware Courl of Chancery: Things of the Past?, 23 
DEL.j. CORP. L. 145 (1998) (explaining how the Delaware courts have developed a reputatio n for be ing 
willing and able to hear litigants on a expedited basis and to render decisions quickly). But see id. at 156 
(sugges ting that this receptiveness may be decreasing). 
166. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at590 (describing "quick judicial decisions" in D elaware) . 
167. Neil Komcsar obse rves that lawmaking institutions arc able to operate more effectively when 
they are not burdened by excessive demands for their services. See NEIL K . KO.\!ESAR, LAw's LIMITS 
(forthcoming 2000). The subject matter limitations on the Chance ry court's jurisdictio n as well as 
Delaware's small size keep the size of the Chance I)" court dockets small relative to those of tria l courtjudges 
in states such as New York or California. 
168. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del Ch. 1998). 
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both under the Delaware statute and under fiduciary principles. 
Additionally, the court explicitly observed that it had no occasion to 
consider whether a pill of limited duration would present similar 
problems to the pill in the case at bar. 159 A subsequent Chancery Court 
decision, lvfentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design ~stems) Inc., 170 struck 
down a variation, a "no-hands" poison pill of limited duration, on 
narrow fiduciary duty grounds. 17 1 Finally, on the appeal of the A1entor 
Graphics decision, 172 the D elaware Supreme Court, working with the 
benefit of a full trial and an opportunity for appellate review, addressed 
the broader legal principle underlying both these decisions. The 
supreme court concluded that the pill 's restrictions on subsequently-
elected directors' ability to redeem the pill and sell the company 
conflicted with the board's statutory power under Delaware section 
14l(a).m 
With respect to many legal issues, the Delaware Supreme Court never 
provides such definitive resolution. Although appellate courts are 
generally viewed as playing a greater lawmaking role than trial courts, 
the exigencies of the business world, in many cases, force the chancery 
court to be the primary lawmaker. Thus, as Ron Gilson has explained, 
during the 1980s, the rapid transactional demands in the takeover 
market resulted in the resolution of many cases before they could be 
reviewed by the supreme court. 174 This caused the Chancery Court to 
be "the court of first and last resort for many takeover contests." 175 
Third, Delaware courts anticipate the effect ofbusiness developments 
and try to develop responsive legal principles. Procedurally, as noted 
above, the Delaware courts structure the temporal reach of their 
decisions in a manner that extends beyond the case at bar. The courts 
seem to be deliberately designing rules for future business transactions. 
Indeed, as Doug Branson has observed, the Delaware courts self-
consciously instruct the business community as to future legal standards 
through lecturing tools such as roadmaps and dicta. 176 
169. See id. at 1195 n.52. 
170. 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
171. See ul. at 38 n.53 (explaining that, because the pill was invalidated on fiduciary duty grounds, 
it was unnecessa ry fo r the court to address alternative arguments that it was invalid). 
172. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
173. See ul. at 1290-91 (concluding that delayed redemption provision violates "fundamental 
Delaware law"). 
174. See Gilson , supra note 131, at915. 
175. ld. a t91 6. 
176. See Branson, supra note 20, at I 04-1 OS (desc ribing "roadmap case"); Charles M. Elson, TlzeDu!J 
of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership, 63 U. C!i\. L. REV. 649, 677 (1995) (explaining tha t Delaware 
Supreme Court's decision in Smith u. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), "served to create a number of 
new and important guideposts to 'informed' [Board] decisionmaking"). 
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It is possible to understand the Delaware Supreme Court's decision 
in Smith v. Van Gorkam 177 in this way. Van Gorkam generated a tremendous 
amount of controversy, even criticism, about the court's decision to 
subject the independent directors to personal liability for violating the 
duty of care. 178 Yet the court's decision can be seen as an early signal of 
concern about the degree of oversight exercised by independent 
directors. 179 .Moreover this signal anticipated, by several years, 
recognition by the investment community of the ri sks posed by 
independent directors who do not devote sufficient attention to 
corporate decisions. 180 
Finally, Delaware can fine-tune and even replace its preliminary 
attempts at regulation if further developments demonstrate that the 
initial rules are problematic. Both the standards based approach, which 
permits easy adjustment to new situations, and the other elements of 
Delaware's flexible use of precedent, allow it easily to adjust legal 
doctrine. As noted above, this flexibility is a function of the atypical 
nature of Delaware corporate decisional law and causes the chancery 
courts, in particular, to act something like administrative agencies. 181 
The courts' developed corporate law expertise allows them to assess the 
impact of their decisions. The facility with which Delaware courts can 
change doctrine allows them to respond to their assessment that a prior 
approach was unworkable or reflected a poor policy judgment. 
C. Political Advantages qf]udicial Lawmaking 
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, Delaware relies heavily 
on its courts to develop principles of corporate law, and Delaware courts 
make law in an unusual way. Why is this structure advantageous to 
177. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
I 78. See Elson , supra note 176, at676 n.52 (desc ribing criticisms of co urt's decisio n). 
179. This signal was not si lenced by the D elaware legislature' s adoption of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ l 02(b)(7 ). Although corporations are now statutorily authotized lO eliminate some types o f director 
liability, the default rule still imposes liability, and not every corporation o pts out of the default rule. See 
Ayres, supra no te 143, at 1412. Moreover, the statute docs not permit li ab ility to be eliminated fo r breaches 
of the duty of loyalty, acts in bad faith, or acll for whic h the director derives an imprope r persona! benefit. 
Se.e R. Franklin Balotti & Mark]. Gentile, Eliminalwn or Limilation rifDirecwr Liabiliryfor Delaware Corpora/ions, 
12 DEL.j. COR!'. L. 5, ll (1987) (p rovid ing tec hnica l analysis o f § I02(b)(7)). 
I 80. See, e.g.,Judith H. Do brzynski, W'hen Direclors Play lvfusical Chairs, N.Y.TI~!ES, Nov. 17, 1996, § 
3, I (desc ribing "trophy directors," well-connec ted, high-pro file individua ls who si t on multiple board s but 
provide questionable value); Jill E. Fisch , T aJd.ng Boards Seri.ou.s[y, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270 (1997) 
(describing efforts by commentators and institutio nal investo rs to increase directo r participation through 
limiting board positions and compensation incentives) . 
181. The analogy to administrative agencies is based bo th o n the specialization of the chancery 
courts, see supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text, and on their structure, see infra notes 2 I 1-214 and 
accompanying text. 
I 
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Delaware corporations? This article has argued that Delaware is able 
to use its courts to fine-tune its legal rules in response to business 
developments in a manner that is more difficult through the legislative 
process. It has also argued that the D elaware courts are highly 
respons1ve. 
Other commentators have, however, emphasized the responsiveness 
of the Delaware legislature as one of the particular advantages of 
D elaware incorporation.' 8'2 Moreover, ifDelaware'sjudiciallawmaking 
resembles legislation, why not rely on the legislative process? This 
section argues th at Delaware's lawmaking structure offers advantages 
over the legislative process by providing superior access, reducing 
political influence, and increasing transparency. These attributes give 
Delaware's lawmaking structure comparative advantages with respect 
to the development of corporate law principles. 
Neil Komesar has done some of the most extensive analysis of 
institutional competence and comparative institutional advantage. 183 
Komesar suggests that legislative and judicial lawmaking may each have 
strengths and weaknesses, but that careful analysis should consider the 
relative competence of each institution. In particular, legislatures may 
suffer from undue political influence , distortions due to rent-seeking, and 
the ability of well-organized interest groups to control the flow of 
information and, to some extent, the legislative agenda. 184 Courts in 
general, and the Delaware courts in particular, may be less susceptible 
to these weaknesses. Moreover, the particular dynamics of corporate 
litigation give courts specific advantages a,s lawmakers. 
One obvious advantage of judicial lawmaking in the business area is 
that it is litigant driven. In essence, the business community has control 
over the lawmaking agenda to a degree that cannot be obtained through 
efforts at legislative influence. Legislators can simply refuse to respond 
to a lawmaking request, deciding that the transaction is too difficult to 
understand, that it is improper to cater to business interests by making 
more corporate law rules, or that the interests of other constituencies 
have a more urgent claim on the lawmaking resources. Although the 
D elaware legislature has traditionally been very responsive to corporate 
requests for rulemaking, many other state legislatures have been less 
responsive, resulting in out-of-date and unworkable corporate statutes. 185 
132. See, e.g., Kaouris, sufJra no te I, at 973 (describing responsiveness of Delawa re legislature to 
corpo rate needs); Romano, supra note 5, at 233-+2 (conducting em piri cal analysis of responsiveness of 
Dela"'are legisla ture). 
183. See Komesar, supra note 77. 
184. See id. a t 53-97 . 
185. See, e.g., Simeon Gold & Don na Killmon, AmendmenL! tnNew York's Business CorjJoralion Lo.w, N .Y. 
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In contrast, business litigants can essentially force the court to evaluate 
the legality of a new type of transaction by bringing the issue to court. 
Komesar argues that the costs of participation represent an important 
consideration in comparing alternative lawmaking institutions. 186 He 
warns that courts are at a comparative disadvantage relative to the 
political process because of the variety ofbarriers to participation in the 
legal system, particularly in cases in which stakes are small and widely 
dispersed. 187 Komesar suggests that it is generally easier and less 
expensive for consumers and voters to register their preferences through 
the political process. 188 
Particular attributes of corporate law suggest, however, that litigation 
may offer advantages over the political process in terms of participant 
access to lawmaking. Many participants in corporate litigation are large 
corporations, the type of sophisticated, large stakes, participants for 
which the access barriers associated with adjudication are unlikely to 
pose a substantial burden. 189 
Shareholders are the other major participants in corporate litigation. 
Komesar's analysis would seem more applicable to shareholders, but 
corporate litigation relies on a variety of substantive and procedural 
rules that affirmatively empower shareholders, increasing their access to 
the lawmaking process in a way that is not replicated in the political 
process. Mechanisms such as the shareholder derivative suit and the 
class action enable dissatisfied shareholders to challenge corporate 
decisionmaking. 1g0 Most importantly, the rules for shareholder litigation 
free individual shareholders from responsibility for funding the costs of 
litigation. A range of fee shifting structures enable courts to award 
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, allocate responsibility for fees to 
the corporation, or assess fees against the trial judgment or settlement 
proceeds. 191 By allowing entrepreneurial plaintiff's la·wyers to fund 
LJ. , Aug. 14, 1997, at 1 (describing the New York corporate statute prio r lO newly adopted amendments 
as "arcane" and "a deficient and innexible tool"). 
186. See Komcsar, supra note 77, at 127. 
187. See id. at 125-28. 
188. See id. 
189. See it!. at 126-28 (describing costs of participation in the adjudicative process). 
190. In corpo rate law, these mechanisms effec tively address Komesar's concern about the effect of 
skewed distribution of stakes on use of the adjudicative process. See id. at 130-33. This is due, in part, to 
the large attorneys' fee awards that are available in corporate litigation. 
191 . See, e.g.,John C. Colfcc,J r., Undestanding the Plaintijf's Atwrruy: The lmplicaiions if Economic Theory 
for Privat~ Enforcement if Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670 n.2 (1986) 
(describing legal rules that lead to these results). 
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shareholder litigation, 192 these rules permit shareholders with limited 
funds to challenge corporations with substantial assets. 
wloreover, the political process is poorly suited for participation by 
investors and competing business interests such as potential acquirers. 
Because of the structure of corporate law, only businesses resident in or 
incorporated in a state will have sufficient interest or ability to 
participate in the political process. Resident corporations can and do 
participate in the legislative process effectively, 193 but this participation 
is, for the most part, not possible for other affected groups. Shareholders 
invest in a variety of corporations that are not incorporated in their 
home state. Even if an investor's stake were sufficient to make 
participation in the political process rational, dispersed nonresident 
shareholders are unlikely to have any influence with the legislature in 
the state ofincorporation. 194 Given individual investors' relatively small 
stakes as well as the dispersion of corporate domiciles, investors are even 
less likely to attempt to buy political influence by making political 
contributions to out of state legislators. Out of state businesses may have 
larger stakes, but are similarly likely to lack political influence in a state 
in which they are not a resident. Moreover, even if political activism 
were viable, a potential acquirer is unlikely to be able to anticipate 
where a future target will be incorporated. 195 Accordingly, although the 
litigation playing field between corporate defendants and shareholder 
challengers may not be level, given that shareholder participation in the 
political process is likely to be nonexistent, shareholders clearly achieve 
greater voice through litigation. 
In addition, various aspects of Delaware law facilitate shareholder 
access to the litigation process. Delaware imposes less onerous 
procedural burdens than many other states on shareholders seeking to 
initiate derivative suits. For example, Delaware does not require 
192. See, e.g. ,John C. Coffee,] r., The Reguu!lion of Entrepreneurial Liligation: Balrmc1ng Fairness and EJfo:ienry 
in the Lmge Cl.n.rs Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (describing economic structure of entrepreneurial 
shareholder litigation); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Refonn, Qyi Tam and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 L. & COi\.TE\IP. 
PROBS. 167, 170-74 (1997) (explaining how shareholder litigation has evolved away from traditional 
litigation model). 
193. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Future if Hostile T akovers: LeJ;islatiun and Public Opinion, 57 U. ClN. 
L. Rev. 45 7, 461 (1988) (describing innuencc of local corporations in persuading state legislatures to adopt 
antitakem·er statutes). 
19+. Voting is the traditional manner by which large dispersed groups exercise political power. See 
Kosmeser, Jupm note 77, at 74 . Nonresident shareholders cannot vote in the state ofincorporation. Indeed 
few investors can vote in Delaware. 
195. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176 (explaining that potential bidder is less likely 
than potential target to care· about innuencing Delaware law, because the law will only a!Tect the bidder 
if it decides to bid for a Delaware target). 
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plaintiffs to post security for expenses, 19G and makes it easy for plaintiff 
shareholders to serve nonresident directors. 197 Delaware law makes it 
more difficult for a corporate board to dismiss shareholder-initiated 
litigation. 198 Delaware courts have been generous in granting plaintiff 
requests for a ttorneys' fees in connection with shareholder suits.1 'J<l 
Some commentators even argue that Delaware decisional law reflects 
a pro-shareholder bias.200 
A second advantage of judicial lawmaking is its independence from 
political influence. Large public corporations have substantial funds 
available to influence political decisionmaking, and they do not hesitate 
to use these funds. 201 Many commentators have expressed concern that 
corporations can exert a distorting influence on the political marketplace 
by drowning out competing arguments through extensive political 
spending. 202 Indeed , the United States Supreme Court has upheld the 
regulation of corporate political expenditures based, in part, on the 
particular threat of political domination. 203 D espite existing regulation, 
corporations have a variety of avenues of political influence available. 
Corporations can and do influence political campaigns through political 
action committees (PACs) and soft money contributions to the national 
196. See, e.g., Macey & Mille r, supra note 5 , a t 511 (contrasting Delaware wi th New Yo rk, 
Pennsylvania , Flo rida and California, all of which require the posting o f a bond). 
197. Su iJ. at 511-12 (explaining how Delaware legislature rapidly responded to co ntinue this 
a pproach after Delaware sequestration statute was ruled unconstitutional). 
198. Set, e.g., William T. Quillen , The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response Ia Professor 
Seligman's Cnllfor Federal Pmmpti.on rf Stal.e Corporate FiducW.ry Lmv, 59 BROOK. L. R£v. I 07, 12 1 ( 1993) 
(describing Delaware hurdles to dismissal as "prodigious" and more onerous than those imposed by several 
courts outside of Delawa re). 
199. See, e.g., Andrew G.T. Moo re, II , Slwrehai.Iler R ighisStil/Aliz•e and Well in Delaware: 17u DmvativeSuiL' 
A Death Greatly Emggerated, 38 ST. Lours LJ. 94 7, 958-59 (1994) (describing gene rosity of Delaware's 
approach to awarding attorneys' fees in derivative suits and explaining that attorney is ent itled to a fee if 
he or she can show any benefit to the corporation , monetary o r nonmoneta ry); Skeel, sujml no te 59, at 23 
(explaining that Delaware is "notably generous in granting atto rneys' fees in shareholde r su its"). 
200. See Branson, supra no te 20, at l 05 (finding evidence supports hypothesis that D eLnvare law ha5 
both substantive and proced ural pro-shareholder biases). 
201. See, e.g., Matt Keller, Ending Greenback Politics, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at 12 (revealing 
that soft money donations in the 1996 elections totaled S262 million); Ann Reilly Dowd, L!ok H'lw 's Cashing 
in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 128 (describing the amount and influence of corporate soft mo ney 
contributions to political action co mmittees). 
202. See, e.g., Andrew Sta rk , Strange Bedfellows: Two Parruloxes in Constitutional Discourse Over corporate and 
lndiviJua.l Political Activiry, 14 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1343, 1370-72 (1993) (describing the a rguments tha t 
co rporate political spe nding co rrupts the political marketplace); David R. Lagasse , Note, Undue lnjluence: 
Corpora/e Polilical Speech, Power and the Initialive Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 134 7, 1349 (1995) (arguing that 
corporations can control outcome of initiative votes because of their ability to outspend other groups). 
203. See Austin v. Michigan St. Chamber of Com. , '~94 U .S. 652, 658-59 (1990) (finding that 
corporate spending can unfairly influence elec tions); see also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 5 77-78 
(1957) (explaining the fear that corpora tions will usc their raw economic power to buy influence with 
elected officials to advance their interests over those of the public). 
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political panies. 204 State campaign fin ance laws, are, in many cases 
more permissive than federal law in allowing direct corporate 
expenditu res in connection with state elections. Finally, corporations 
exe rt extensive political pressure through lobbying, which is not subject 
to the legal restrictions that apply to election contributions and 
d. ~O'i expen nures.- · 
Commentators have observed how interest groups may influence the 
legislative process. 20G The ability of politicians to extract funds from 
corporations creates the potential for legislators to extract rents through 
regulation. This focus on rent extraction, in addition to imposing 
substantial costs on political participants, can distort the ultimate choice 
of legal rules. 207 Indeed, although legislative lawmaking is sometimes 
defended as the product of more complete information than that which 
is available to courts,20B the interes t group dynamics in corporate 
iawmaking present particular risks of distortion because in-state 
corpora tions, as the only effective political participants, can manipulate 
the information available to political decisionmakers. 209 
Judges obviously are not subject to the same types of direct political 
influence as legislators.210 Ethical rules and prohibitions on ex parte 
communications prohibit litigants from lobbying judges. D elaware 
204. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 201, at 12 (explaining how the "soft money loophole " allows 
corporations to circumvent legal li mits on politica l contributions); Adam \Vinker, Election Law As Its Own 
Field of Study· 77u Corporalion '!)-Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1243, 1265 (1999) ("Corporation are 
a llowed to use shareholder funds to crea te and adm inister co rporate PACs, and make unregulated and 
unlimited soft money contributions to the national political parties from their general treasuries.") (c itations 
om itted). 
205. See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellolli, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 133, 168-69 (1998) (explaining that 
compaign finance laws do not restri ct cm·porate lo bbying, o n which ofte n spend much more than on 
initia tives o r candidate campaigns); Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Aionster Hits thL Campaign TraiL· An Approach 
to Regulolion of Corporate Political £,penditures, 32 W!>-·1. & MARY L. REV. 587, 597n. 63 (1991 )(describing 
co rporate lobbying). Indeed, until 1993, section l 62(e) o f the inte rnal revenue code allowed a tax 
ded uction for co rporate lobbying expe nses. See Shannon King, Note, The Lobbying Deduction Disallowance: 
Policy Consi1lerations, Comparisons and Structuring Aclizities Under Amended Section 162(e), 15 VA. T fu"X REv. 551, 
552 (1996) (desc ribing elimina tion o f the tax deduc tion for corpo rate direct lobbying expenses). 
206. Se<, e.g. , Ca rney, supra note 5 at 716 (citing concerns expressed ove r interest group innucnce over 
corpo rate law); Komesar, sujmi note 77, at54-75 (explaining interest gro up theory of politics and detailing 
ways in which interest groups can exert innuen ce over politica l process). 
207. See, e.g., Carney, suf;ra note 5 a t 7 17 (desc ribing rent-seeking in connectio n with the productio n 
o f co rporate law and desc ribing rent-seeking prob lem as greatest with respect to management spo nsored 
changes in co1-po 1·ate rules). 
208. Cf Sau l M. Pi !chen, Politics v. tk Cloister: Dmding When tkSupreme Cowt Should Defer to Congmsional 
Factjinding Under tk Post-Cu•il vVar Amendments, 59 NOTRE DA!\fE L. REV. 337, 375-76 (1984) (c ritiqu ing the 
argu ment tha t the legisl ative investigative apparatus is superior and that, as a result, legislatures a re better 
factfin ders than co urts). 
209. See Komesar, supra note 77, a t 62-63 (exp laining how concentrated gro ups with large stakes can 
prese nt distorted pictures of the public interes t to political o ffi cia ls). 
210. See id. at 124 (desc ribing structure of judicial independence). 
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judges also enjoy an unusual degree of political independence relative 
to other state judges. Delaware is one of only twelve states to use 
appointed rather than elected judges.211 Both chancery and supreme 
court judges are appointed, based on a system of merit selection, for 
renewable twelve year terms,21 2 thereby insulating the courts, to a large 
degree, from the political pressures that judges in other states may 
face. 213 Finally, the Delaware Constitution mandates balance between 
the two major political parties in appointment of Delaware judges .2 14 
These factors contribute to insulating Delaware judges relative to 
legislators from political influence. 
A comparison ofDelaware's legislative and judicial lawmaking in the 
takeover area provides some support for the hypothesis that Delaware's 
judiciary is subject to less political influence than its legislature. The 
political process leading to state adoption of anti takeover statutes has 
been widely analyzed. 21 5 Commentators have observed that state 
antitakeover legislation was widely adopted in response to local 
corporations seeking protection from hostile bidders.216 As Romano 
explains, antitakeover statutes "are frequently pushed through the 
legislature at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of 
a hostile bid or apprehension that it will become a target."217 Delaware 
was not exempt from this process; indeed the Delaware statute was the 
21 1. See Martin Scott Drigge rs,] r. , Soutlz Carolina's £,-perimenL· Legis/alive Conlrol '!f]udicinllvltril Seleclion, 
't9 S.C. L. REv. 1217, 1222 n.39 (1998) (citing Delaware as one of nine states in which judges arc appointed 
by the governor; in three others, the legislature appoints judges). Because many states use a co mbination 
of methods in se lecting their judiciary, some sources classify states differently. See id. at 1222 , n.38. See also 
Edwin Chemerinsky, Presening an lndependenl)udiciary: The Need for Conlribulion rmd Etpenditures Limils in Judicial 
Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998) (explaining that state judges are elected in 23 states and face 
periodic retent ion elections in fifteen other states). 
212. Delaware Const. of 1897, Art. 4, § 3. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supm no te 26, at 835 (desc ribing 
development of Cons titutional provisions for appointment o f Delaware judges); Moscow, supra note 57, at 
19 17 (explaining the structure of the Delaware Supreme Court). 
2 13 . See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington,Judicinl Independence Md Democralu Accounuibili!Y in Highesl Su1/.e Courls, 
61 LAw & CONIEMP. PROBS. 79 (1998) (discussing degree to whi ch election of state judges may subj ect 
judicial dccisionmaking to political influence). 
214. DEL. Co:--.:sT. an. I.V., § 3. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale For Judicial 
DecisonmaJ:ing in Corporau UIUJ, 53 BUS. LAW. 681 ( 1998) (describing se lection process fo r D elaware judges). 
215. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Pulilical Economy ofTakover Slal.utes, 73 VA. L. REV. Ill (1987) 
(explo ring politics behind enactment o f Connecticut anti takeover statute); R omano, mpra note 192, at 461 
(describing political process leading to adoption of state antitakcover statutes); Carney, supra note 5, at 750-
5 I (desc ribing process of enacting state anti takeover statutes). 
216. See, e.g., Carney supra note 5, at 750-51 (listing co rporate sponsors of state antitaknwer statutes); 
R omano, supra note 192, at 461 n. 11 (citing examples of statutes passed in response to pressure imposed 
by local corporations on state legislatures). 
217. Romano, supra note 193, at 461; set also Romano, supra note 215, at 120 (describing the po litical 
process by which Ae tna en listed the support of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association to lobby 
effectively for the adoption of an anti takeover statute in Connecticut). 
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product of corporate influence and lobbying efforts. 218 The result of this 
political influence is legislation that uniformly favors the interests of 
corporate management. 219 Although state antitakeover statutes vary in 
the extent to which they limit the potential for a hostile takeover, in all 
cases, the statutes, including Delaware's antitakeover statute, make 
takeovers more difficult. 
In contrast, courts have responded to takeover litigation with an 
attempt to balance deference to management decisionmaking with 
concern over shareholder treatment. 220 The result, in Delaware, is a 
series of decisions221 that increase the degree of judicial scrutiny and 
heighten management obligations beyond the traditional business 
judgment rule analysis.222 In other words, corporate management has 
been able to obtain more favorable takeover regulation in the legislature 
than in the courts. This outcome is likely the result of the greater 
opportunity for potential target corporations to influence lawmaking 
through the political process than through litigation. 
Finally, judicial decisionmaking has the advantage of greater 
transparency than legislative lawmaking. The specific effects of 
corporate influence in politics are difficult to identify. Disclosure of 
corporate political spending is spotty and incomplete. .Nlore 
importantly, the substantive arguments that corporations make to 
legislators through lobbying and political spending are made in private, 
with no forum for response or public debate. The political process thus 
creates a real possibility that legislators will not receive a balanced 
perspective or even hear both sides of an issue. 223 When legislators 
218. See Romano, Jupra note 193, at 462-64 (describing adoption of Delaware statute and lobbying 
by corporate executives over the legislation). 
219. Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell explain that the political process is poorly suited to reflect the 
views of those who oppose anti takeover legislation. In addition to shareholders, who face collective action 
problems, prospective bidders are likely to oppose restrictions on takeovers. Yet, because antitakcover 
statutes protect targcl';, not bidders, a prospective acquirer is unlikely to lind it useful to oppose anti takeover 
legislation even in ilS home state, since it cannot predict which state's law will apply to a future acquisition. 
See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176-77. 
220. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 106, at 152 n. 75 (describing Rwlon and Unocal decisions as 
acknowledging the importance of shareholder prerogative and management discretion). 
221. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 
5 71 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); and Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
222. See Paul L. Regan, Great E>:pecltllions? A Con/mel Lnw Ana!Jsir.for Preclusive C!JTjlorale Lock-ups, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 97 (1999) (describing Delaware takeover law as providing that board decisions 
approving change of control will be subjected to substantive judicial review without any threshold showing 
by stockholder that board breached il'; fiduciary duty); cf. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, 
Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law) (placing the initial burden on the plaintiff to 
prove a director's breach of fiduciary duty in a takeover situation). 
223. See Komesar, supra note 77, at 63 (explaining how concentrated groups can distort information 
about the public interest and mislead even a public-interested public official). 
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decide to act, the legislative process provides a poor record of the basis 
for the legal rules that are enacted. Legislative history is incomplete and 
readily manipulated. 224 vVithout an indication of why legislators made 
their decisions, it is more difficult for critics to challenge the resulting 
laws. 
Judicial lawmaking is far more transparent than legislative 
lawmaking. The adversary process provides a mechanism for presenting 
both sides of an issue to the decisionmaker. The litigation process itself 
is open to the public, and the pendency oflegal questions is a matter of 
public record . Even nonlitigants have the opportunity to ensure that the 
court has the benefit of full information on an issue by submitting 
amicus briefs. Finally, by making law through the process of issuing 
written opinions, judges provide the business community and the public 
with an explanation of the reasons for their decisions. 225 Because the 
Chancery courts are courts of equity they sit without juries and maintain 
a tradition ofissuingwritten opinions. These practices distinguish them 
from trial courts in other states. 
IV. THE ANALYSIS .APPLIED-INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM 
Institutional activism provides a case study with which to apply the 
foregoing analysis and consider Delaware's ability to respond to changes 
in the business world. The activism of institutional investors represents 
a major and relatively recent business development. Institutions are 
becoming increasingly involved in corporate governance.226 Institutions 
have experimented with negotiation, litigation, and shareholder voting 
as tools for influencing corporate decisionmaking on topics ranging from 
224. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory lnterjmlation, 17 HARV.J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994) (s tating that legislative history is "slanted, drafted by the staff a nd perhaps by 
private interest groups"); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use qf Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 
37!, 376 (1987) (c laiming that the grea tes t concern about legislative history is "its potential for 
manipulation"); Danie l A. Farber & PhilipP. F rickey, Legi.rlall:Ve Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 
423 ( 1988) (explaining how legislawrs and legislative stafT members can insert false ra tionales for legislation 
into legislative repo rts) . 
225. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, OjJiJZivns as Rub, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1465-66 (1995) 
(explaining how judicial opinions provide litigants and the public with explanati ons of the results reached); 
see genaal!y Frederick Schauer, Curing Reasons, 4 7 STAN. L. RE.v. 633 ( 1995) (examining extent to which legal 
decisionmakers give reasons for their decisions). 
226. See, e.g., Mark R . Winge rson & Christopher H. Do rn, lnstitutionallnuestors in the US. and tlu: Repeal 
q[Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1992 COLU:"vl. Bt..;S. L. REV. 223, 226-235 (1992) (d escribing recen t 
increase in institutional investor activism and detailing strategies employed by institutional investors to 
affect corpo rate governance). 
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executive compensation to board composition to corporate employment 
policies. 227 
The academy is sharply divided on the implications of institutional 
activism for firm value.228 O n the one hand, activism offers the 
possibility of reducing agency costs through the involvement of 
sophisticated monitors with substantial stakes.229 On the other hand, 
institutional interests may differ from those of other inves tors, causing 
activism to reduce overall firm value. 230 In addition, institutions' access 
to managers creates the possibility for collusion. 231 
States can approach the issue of institutional activism in several ways. 
One possibility is for state lawmakers to determine the appropriate level 
ofinstitutional participation in corporate governance and to adopt legal 
rules tailored toward achieving that level. A second possibility is for 
states to maintain the existing legal allocation of decisionmaking 
responsibility, which largely reserves such decisionmaking for corporate 
management and limits opportunities for shareholder voice. A third 
alternative would expand the opportunities for shareholder voice and 
monitoring, with the expectation that institutional activism would 
improve corporate decisionmaking. 232 
These regulatory approaches have several problems. Each requires 
states to make a normative judgment about the appropriate level of 
institutional activism. In light of the inability of even academics to agree 
on the potential value of institutional participation in corporate 
governance, it is unclear that state lawmakers are capable of making this 
assessment. Structural flaws in the legislative process are likely further 
to detract from legislators' ability to evaluate institutional activism. Like 
state antitakeover statutes, regulation addressing institutional activism 
227. Su id. 
228. Su]ill E. Fisch, Relntionsh'p fm•e.rting· Hli/1 it Hnppm-' Will it H'ark?, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. I 009, I 009-
11 (1994) (describing academ ic commentary deba ting the like lihood and effec tiveness of institutio na l 
activism). 
229. See, t.g., Bern ardS. Black,AgenLr Watchi.ngAgenLr: Th Promise ifinstilutionul Investor Voice, 29 UCLA 
L. REV. 8 11 (1992) (describing how institutional activism can improve corporate gove rnance); Ronald]. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing tht Outside Director: An Agenda )or Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 863 (199 1) (advoca ting greater inst itutio na l activism). 
230. Se.e, e.g., R obe rta Romano, Public Pension Fund Acti.tirm in CorfJorate Governance R eco='rfered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1993) (express ing co ncern that po litica l pressure wi ll cause public pension 
funds to pursue goals other than maximization o f share value). 
231. See, e.g., Fisch, o11pra no te 223 , at I 033-+5 (explain ing potential for institut ional im'estor to pu rsue 
pri va te ga ins through activism); Edward B. Roc k, Controlling tht Dark Sitk if Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 987, 989-93 ( 1994) (describing pursu it of' private gains as '"corrup t"' relationa l investing) . 
232. This is not unlike the SEC's 1992 amendments li bera lizing the federal proxy rules to faci litate 
increased shareholder activism through the proxy process. Sa Fisch, mpra note 223, a t I 013-19 (describ ing 
amendments as a "direct response to complaints by institutio nal investors tha t the proxy rules prevented 
them from . .. pa rticipa ting effectively in co rpora te governance"). 
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is likely to be strongly influenced by interest group dynamics. In 
particular, corporate management has an obvious stake in limiting the 
degree to which corporate law facilitates institutional activism. 
Moreover, institutions are unlikely to be effective counterweights to 
management's political influence. Institutions are poorly organized 
political actors, with little ability to lobby effec tively. 233 Their political 
weakness is evidenced by their relative impotence in connection with 
state adoption of anti takeover legislation. 
Additionally, responding to institutional activism is responding to a 
moving target. As institutions and issuers work through corporate 
governance issues, the nature of institutional activism has evolved, and 
this evolution is likely to continue.23+ Even a careful legislative 
assessment of the appropriate regulatory approach may rapidly become 
out of date as institutions become more sophisticated, more corrupt or 
more innovative in their activism. 
Finally, clear rules that specify the appropriate degree of institutional 
involvement create incentive problems. Rules favoring management 
discretion can potentially frustrate institutional attempts to monitor and 
can eliminate any incentive on the part of corporate management to 
negotiate with institutions. Rules favoring institutions create the 
potential for excessive litigation and give institutions a tool that they can 
use strategically. Indeed, rules that broadly empower institutions can 
lead to rent-seeking and the extraction of private gains. 
Delaware law takes a different approach. First, Delaware's muddy 
rules encourage institutions and management to bargain over 
governance changes rather than litigating or stonewalling. Second, 
judicial review of management responses to institutional activism 
conducted through the framework of fiduciary principles allows courts 
to oversee and respond to changes in the nature of institutional activism. 
Judicial review also allows courts to rebalance the legal structure in 
response to perceived overreaching on the part of either institutions or 
management. The flexibility provided by Delaware law enhances 
judicial power to prevent opportunism. This backdrop of judicial 
oversight may give the parties increased confidence to negotiate 
voluntarily. Finally, judicial lawmaking provides institutions ,\lith 
233. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., TJu Folldorel!flnves!M CajJilalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1970, 1981 ( 1997) 
("Fragmented among tens of thousands of pension and mutual funds, and lacking the lobbying resources 
of corporate managements, institutional investors are anything but an ef1iciently organized political or 
economic force. Coo rdination among them remains largely ad hoc and crisis-driven."). 
234. See, e.g. , Wingcrson & Dom, supra note 226, at 234 (describing how nature of institutional 
activism has changed). 
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greater access to the lawmaking structure than they are likely to achieve 
in the legislature. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In analyzing regulatory competition in corporate law, commentators 
have focused on substantive law. A comparative institutional 
perspective suggests, however, that a regulator can also provide 
advantages through its lawmaking process. Because of the inherent 
difficulty in evaluating substantive provisions of corporate law and in 
tracing incorporation decisions to differences bet:vveen states, 235 a process 
oriented approach offers the potential for new insights about the value 
of state competition. 
Although it has received little attention, Delaware's corporate 
lawmaking process addresses systematic challenges in structuring 
corporate regulation. These challenges include the difficulty of 
assessing the impact of corporate rules on various corporate 
constituencies and the problems associated with designing rules that 
must function in a rapidly changing business environment. Delaware's 
equity courts are able to formulate flexible yet responsive legal principles 
that permit transactional evolution without increasing strategic 
behavior. 
The manner in which Delaware courts maintain an aggressive 
lawmaking agenda, focus on articulation of principles to govern future 
standards, and freely adjust previously announced principles based on 
policy considerations, resembles the legislative process. At the same 
time, the standards based muddiness ofDelaware law retains a degree 
of ex post review for which courts are well suited. In addition, 
Delaware's extensive reliance on judicial lawmaking offers several 
advantages over the legislative process, including greater and more 
balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political 
independence, and enhanced decisionmaking transparency. This article 
has argued that this lawmaking structure is particularly appropriate in 
corporate law. 
In conclusion, the peculiar role of the Delaware courts may provide 
greater explanatory power for Delaware's success in attracting corporate 
charters than previously identified theories. Delaware has developed a 
unique corporate lawmaking structure and process. If, as this article 
235. See, e.g. ,Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Wmner, 20J. CORP. L. 451 (1995) (question ing validity of relying 
on event studies to evaluate regulatory change). 
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suggests, D elaware lawmaking addresses the needs of corporations, it 
may explain why Delaware is consistently winning the race. 
